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THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SURVEY 
 
ANTHONY BONEN*  
TERESA GHILARDUCCI** 
 
*** 
 
This article discusses the impact changes to the retirement age may have 
on the distribution of retirement time.  The author investigates the length of 
time men and women are alive between the date of their retirement and 
their death, finding that the most critical factor in determining length of 
retirement time is and individual’s socio-economic status.  As a result, the 
author opines that because individuals in lower economic classes tend to 
die earlier, increasing the retirement age will impact these individuals 
disproportionally and increase retirement time inequality. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, economic inequality in the United States reached its 
highest level in 100 years.1 Increasingly, inequality is considered by global 
                                                                                                                                
*Graduate Student, Economics Department, The New School for Social 
Research. 
**Irene and Bernard L. Schwartz Chair of Economic Policy Analysis, 
Professor of Economic Policy Analysis and Chair of Economics Department, and 
corresponding author. 
1 Every year from 1913 to 2012 (the earliest and latest years for which data is 
available) the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% of income earners won a greater share of 
national 2012-value-income than in any previous year (this is true whether one 
includes or excludes capital gains). See Facundo Alvaredo et al., The Database, 
THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://topincomes.gmond.parisschool 
ofeconomics.eu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (accessed by selecting the “The 
Database” link and then selecting the corresponding country and years). Census 
data for the Gini coefficient (which is negatively related with the degree of 
equality) has steadily increased since 1967 when records began. In 2012 (and 
2011) the Gini coefficient was 0.477 – roughly equal to the Gini measure of 
inequality for Singapore, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic. See Historical 
Income Tables: Households tbl.H-4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census. 
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economic and financial leaders to be the principal barrier to economic 
growth.2 However, the disparity of wealth and income do not alone convey 
the deepening stratification of American society.  An equally important 
dimension of well-being is access to time at the end of a person’s working 
life.  We identify “retirement time” as a resource that employees consume 
after permanently exiting the labor market.  Retirement time is simply the 
time between retiring and dying: the difference between the age at death 
and the age at the start of retirement.  Upper income individuals live longer 
than lower income workers and the longevity gap has grown wider by 
socio-economic status (SES) over time.3 We expect the growing inequality 
of longevity due to SES, coupled with the increasing effort that lower-
income older people are making to stay in the labor force, will cause 
retirement time to become more unequally distributed between SES groups.  
A growing time-inequality should be avoided because retirement time is 
one of the only areas where the nation has made significant progress 
achieving equality among working people.4 
On average, Americans over age sixty-five are living longer, but 
longevity gains are unequally distributed between people of different races, 
between men and women, and among those of different socio-economic 
status.5 For example, white men’s longevity at age seventy-five increased 
25% between 1980 and 2000, whereas black men’s increase in life 
expectancy at age seventy-five grew by 22.9% over the same time period.6 
                                                                                                                                
gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ (follow “Table H-4” hyperlink) 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
2 See Larry Elliot, Income Gap Poses Biggest Threat to Global Community, 
Warns WEF, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2014, available at http://www.the guardian 
.com/business/2014/jan/16/income-gap-biggest-risk-global-community-world-
economic-forum. 
3 That is, not only has income and wealth grown wider, so too has the gap in 
longevity. See Julian P. Cristia, Rising Mortality and Life Expectancy Differentials 
by Lifetime Earnings in the United States, (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working 
Paper No. 665, 2009); Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2007, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 28, 2011, at 48. 
4 See infra App. A.  
5  NAT’L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH 
PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA: THE HEALTH & RET. STUDY 
20 (2007). 
6 Number of years expected to live from age seventy-five onwards is 10.1 and 
12.5 years respectively for white males and females, and 11.7 and 14.1 years 
respectively for black males and females. See infra App. A. 
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But small differences in rates of change compound over time.  The 
white/black gap in age seventy-five life expectancy in 2010 was only nine 
months.  If trends continue however, in twenty years the difference will be 
over one year and three months.  Though longevity is on track to become 
more unequal, analysis of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 7 
demonstrates that retirement time is still remarkably equal among the last 
generation of workers – our current retirees – primarily because lower 
income people tend to retire earlier. 
While retirement time had been an equalizing asset between 
members of different income classes,8 there is nascent evidence that the 
distribution of retirement time may become more unequal.9 Income, of 
course, is not the only factor driving the distribution of retirement time.  
Not surprisingly, healthier individuals consume more retirement time 
because they live longer.9 Further, although it was not expected, men have 
more retirement time than women who have retired.10 Also unexpected is 
that since lower income workers retire earlier than higher income workers, 
the lower income groups have, on average, more retirement time. 11 
However, these results are reversed among middle class elderly persons 
(i.e., among the group excluding retirees in the top 20% and bottom 20% of 
the income distribution). 12  When focusing on the middle 60% of the 
distribution, there is evidence that retirement time inequality may be on the 
rise.13 
Retirement time inequality will also likely increase as a result of 
the continuing weakness of the U.S. labor market as older workers 
(especially those with less income) work, or search for work, later into life 
than previous cohorts.  We also expect, as the panel grows larger, the bias 
in the data set (containing a disproportionate share of people who die 
earlier than normal) will dissipate.  The HRS panel data has only a small 
                                                                                                                                
7 See infra note 41. 
8  Although SES is the key conceptual division, we will avoid the 
complications of defining precise SES criteria and instead focus simply on full-
time labor market income as a rough proxy for SES. 
9 See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 56-
60. 
9 Id. at 40. 
10 Id. at 22, 35, 40. 
11 Id. at 51-65. 
12 Id. 
13 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51-65. 
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number of respondents who have died after living an average life span,14 
which means the sample is not perfectly representative of the population.  
However, the large sample currently available is representative in some key 
dimensions, such as health status.  Despite the limitations in the data, we 
find support for the hypothesis that the distribution of retirement time 
remains relatively equal because upper-middle class income men work 
longer and retire at older ages.  However, there is nascent evidence that this 
equity is eroding. 
Retirement time inequality should inform policies concerning the 
appropriate “normal retirement age” in Social Security, Medicare, and 
other old age programs.  If benefits are cut by raising the age participants 
can collect full benefits, then lower income workers will likely work later 
into life, eroding their retirement time relative to wealthier and/or healthier 
individuals.  To date, the nation’s old age programs are among the few 
mechanisms that mitigate the impacts of deepening inequality of wealth, 
income, opportunity and mortality in the United States. 
 
II.  RETIREMENT IN AMERICA – BACKGROUND AND 
RECENT FINDINGS 
 
Since the 1950s, the labor force participation of men over age fifty 
declined across all income groups as the expansion of Social Security made 
retirement income more equally distributed than preretirement income.15 
Defined benefit (DB) pension plans were more prevalent in jobs that were 
physically taxing, so those with lower than average longevity were able to 
retire sooner.16 This recent success in achieving some equity in retirement 
time stems from the design of the American retirement and disability 
income system, which has its roots in social systems developed for state 
and municipal employees at the turn of the last century.17 These systems 
were extended to most private sector workers with the adoption of Social 
                                                                                                                                
14 Id. 
15 Edward N. Wolff, Pensions in the 2000s: The Lost Decade? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16991, 2011), available at http://www.nber 
.org/papers/w16991. 
16 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51. 
17 See ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1, 167-71 (2003). 
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Security in 1935.18 More workers were able to retire when Social Security 
old age benefits and disability programs expanded significantly from the 
1950s through to the 1970s.19 This came with the coincident growth of 
unions and employer-based DB pension plans in the 1940s and continuing 
until the 1970s.20 Further, Medicare was established in 1965, providing 
universal health insurance for those over age sixty-five, which significantly 
improved the health and longevity of the aged. 21  As a result of these 
changes, workers in all socioeconomic groups were able to control some of 
their own leisure time before they died. 
In 2008, Teresa Ghilarducci was the first scholar to measure the 
distribution of retirement time, finding that the distribution of retirement 
time was strikingly equal for people who died before age sixty-five. 22 
Relying on the 2006 HRS sample, Ghilarducci found that the top income-
earning quintile of retirees between ages fifty and sixty-five had 
approximately the same share of retirement time as the other four quintiles 
in the same age range.23 The analysis added together retirement times of 
these retirees before age sixty-five and then found each quintile’s relative 
share of the total sum of retirement time.24 The top quintile accounted for 
their proportionate share of retirement time consumed before the age of 
sixty-five.  Specifically, retired men in the top 20% of the asset distribution 
– those with assets worth over $271,000 – had 5.57 years of retirement time 
before the age of sixty-five and accounted for 22% of the total amount of 
retirement time.25 Men in the bottom 20% – those with an average debt of 
$6,000 – accounted for 18% of the total retirement time before the age of 
sixty-five.26 Furthermore, Ghilarducci noted that although the top 20% of 
the men had 85% of all the wealth and the poorest 20% were in debt, the 
distribution of retirement time before age sixty-five was almost equal.27 For 
                                                                                                                                
18 See Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program & 
Policy History, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 1-3 (2005). 
19 Id. at 1, 7-9. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 8. 
22  See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 200-01 (2008). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 200. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 201. 
27 Ghilarducci, supra note 22, at 201. 
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women the distribution of pre-sixty-five retirement time was also equal.28 
The top and bottom fifths of women accounted for the same share of 
retirement time – 22.6% for the top and 22.7% for the bottom.29 
Furthermore, Ghilarducci found that women and men, blacks and 
whites, high and low income, have approximately the same amount of 
retirement time prior to age sixty-five.30  She argued retirement time is 
distributed relatively equally because in the United States the “retirement 
date” is flexible.31 Many defined benefit plans allow pension collection 
before age sixty-two, when workers become eligible for early Social 
Security benefits. 32  Similarly, Social Security and workplace disability 
pensions are available before age sixty-two for eligible workers (albeit at 
the cost of reduced benefits).33 In some pension plans, American workers 
can start collecting a defined benefit pension as early as age fifty.34  
Because age discrimination is illegal in the United States,35 many 
older workers are able to stay in the labor market beyond age sixty-five.36 
Since professionals are likely to work later into life than blue-collar 
workers,37 a retirement system can be more balanced and fair even in the 
face of longevity differences among social economic classes.  In fact, 
pension systems that allow and encourage people who die sooner than 
average to retire sooner than average – Social Security and DB pensions 
have these features38 – are potentially very progressive.  If people who die 
earlier also retire at younger ages they could conceivably have the same 
amount of retirement time as higher-income people who live longer.  In 
contrast, 401(k)-type pensions (defined contribution (DC) pensions) 
accumulate significantly as a person ages and pays out lump sums so that 
retiring earlier is often difficult for lower income individuals.39 Finally, 
people without employer-based pensions or independent assets would need 
to work longer, as they can rely only on Social Security benefits.  Workers 
                                                                                                                                
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 214. 
31 Id. at 215. 
32 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57-62. 
33 Id. at 62. 
34 Id. 
35 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008). 
36 Id.  
37 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757 supra note 5, at 43-44. 
38 Id. at 51. 
39 Id. 
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in such situations are predominantly low-income earners with shorter life 
spans.  As DC plans replace traditional DB pensions and as coverage by 
any employer based retirement plan has stagnated, 40  one of the key 
equalizing mechanisms of the American retirement system will be lost. 
 
III.  HRS DATA ON RETIREMENT TIME DISTRIBUTION AND 
METHODOLOGY41 
 
HRS is administered by the University of Michigan every two 
years as a series of in-depth interviews with people age fifty and over.42 
The first cohort began in 1992 and included more than 10,000 
respondents.43 The latest available survey is data from 2010.44 Our sample 
comes from each of the ten surveys.  Every sixth year (or third survey), the 
HRS adds approximately 5,000 new participants in order to maintain a 
sample.45 The panel nature of the HRS data is essential to determining 
individuals’ time spent in retirement since we need to know the year and 
month of both retirement and of death.  The key variable, retirement time, 
is measured as the difference between the respondent’s year of death and 
year of retirement, plus the numeric difference between her or his month of 
death and the month of retirement where months are coded sequentially, 
with January equal to one and December equal to twelve.46 
 
                                                                                                                                
40 Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: 
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2011, 378 EMP. BEN. RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 
1, 26, 36 (2012), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB _11-
2012_No378_RetParticip.pdf. 
41 Health and Retirement Study, U. MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; Sample Sizes and Response Rates, U. MICHIGAN, 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/sitedocs/sampleresponse.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014). 
46 This coding pattern assumes that reported dates occur at the end of the 
reported month. Alternatively, one could code months as January = 0, February = 
1, … December = 11. The reported result would not differ. 
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ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܶ݅݉݁ 
ൌ ൤ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨
െ ൤ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(1) 
 
Defining the start of retirement can be difficult since many people 
continue to work, volunteer, or do other activities after they leave a long-
term career.  Judging what is or is not retirement from work is difficult.  
We use HRS respondents’ own declaration of whether or not they are 
retired.  Specifically, the survey asks respondents if they are retired, 
disabled or working, and the date of their retirement.47 However, if an 
individual reports she is retired in 1994, working in 1996, and then retired 
again in 1998, equation (1) uses her most recent statement of retirement 
year and retirement month (i.e., whatever year and month she states in the 
1998 survey wave). 
 To calculate retirement and death ages, we use a similar formula as 
(1).  We calculate individuals’ age of retirement based on their latest 
answer to their year/month of retirement by subtracting the respondent’s 
year and month of birth. 
 
 
ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܣ݃݁
ൌ ൤ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨
െ  ൤ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(2) 
 
Finally we compute age at death with a similar subtraction: 
 
 
ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܣ݃݁ 
ൌ ൤ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
െ ൤ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(3) 
 
                                                                                                                                
47  Health and Retirement Study, supra note 41; 2010 Questionnaire, U. 
MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/2010/core/qnaire/ online 
/10hr10JCore.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
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Once these core values are computed, we restrict the data set to 
respondents who report at least one instance of full-time labor market 
income.48 In addition to dividing the sample of 12,033 respondents by their 
labor market status, this restriction ensures that we analyze the retirement 
patterns of workers.  Since workers report labor market income in various 
years, we adjust all values to 2008 dollars according to the Census 
Bureau’s consumer price index (CPI) for the appropriate year. 49  After 
adjusting for inflation, we calculate each respondent’s mean full-time 
income.  Thus, if a respondent reports full-time income in only one survey 
year, this amount is his average real income; if a respondent reports full-
time income in three separate surveys her average real income is one-third 
of the sum of the adjusted values. 
The sample sizes for retirement time, retirement age and death age 
are different because more respondents (5,557) consider themselves retired 
(and provide the interviewer with a valid retirement year and month) than 
have died.  Since the first HRS wave was in 1992, and the latest available 
data is from 2010, the youngest respondent would be fifty years old (the 
age one enters the HRS) plus eighteen years, or sixty-eight years old.  This 
limitation leads to a much smaller number of observed death ages (1,418) 
since these individuals must have reported at least one year of full-time 
labor market income before retiring and dying.  However, since many 
respondents may have worked and died without ever retiring, the number 
of those with a retirement time is about half of those with a death age.50 
 
A.  DOWNWARD LONGEVITY BIAS 
 
 Because the survey is only eighteen years old, the majority of 
respondents are still alive.  Due to this, we cannot know living retirees’ 
total retirement time, which creates a bias in our data set because less than 
12% (1,418/12,033 = 11.7%) of the eligible sample are deceased.  Among 
                                                                                                                                
48 We define full-time labor market attachment as respondents who described 
the “usual” working time as at least thirty-five hours per week and “usual” work 
frequency as forty weeks per year. 
49  See Minn. Population Ctr., Univ. of Minn., Note on Adjusting Dollar 
Amount Variables for Inflation (CPI-U), IPUMS-CPS, https://cps.ipums.org/cps/ 
intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“The IPUMS variable CPI99 provides an 
easy way to adjust dollar amounts to constant dollars”). 
50 An individual could also have no measured retirement time because not all 
the necessary data points (year of death, month of death, year of retirement and 
month of retirement) were recorded, so retirement time was not computed. 
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the deceased, only half (725/1,418 = 51.3%) have a corresponding 
retirement date by which retirement time can be calculated.  The resulting 
problem is a downward bias in longevity as shown by the low mean death 
age of 67.9 in our sample.  Therefore, the results reported here must be 
recognized as representing an unfortunate (early death) subgroup of the 
population.  Key variables are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Employing different techniques or restrictions to correct for the 
downward bias in death age, however, does not alter the central results of 
our analysis.  One method is restricting the sample to respondents aged 
sixty or older when they first entered the HRS.  To partially mitigate the 
large reduction in sample size of this approach we drop the full-time 
restriction on labor market income.  These two changes generate a sample 
of approximately 3,100 – about one-quarter the size of our chosen sample.  
The benefit of this smaller sample is that the downward longevity bias is 
largely removed as the average age of death increases from 67.9 to 77.4, 
which is comparable to this generation’s expected longevity.51 However, 
not only does this approach require an arbitrary age cut off, but the 
inclusion of part-time income greatly skews the average real income 
                                                                                                                                
51  The current longevity estimate for those born in the 1930s is 83.8 years.  
See generally Arias, supra note 3, at 48. 
Table 1: Sample Summary for HRS Respondents with Some Full-Time 
Income  
 Observations Mean Value Standard Deviation 
Total Number of 
Respondents 12,033   
Death Age 1,418 67.86 7.57 
Retirement Age 5,557 62.10 5.57 
Retirement Time 725 8.71 5.68 
Average Real 
Income (Full-
Time) 
12,033 $51,173 $58,550 
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variable downward.52 Therefore, correcting for one skew in the sample’s 
distribution introduces another, but at the additional cost of many lost 
observations. 
Yet, in spite of these imposed restrictions, the overall results did 
not substantially change: men still had more retirement time than women, 
working men retired earlier than working women, and having a pension 
continues to appear to have little impact on retirement time.  Moreover, 
retirement time in the restricted sample is still negatively related to income 
overall, but it is positively correlated among the middle 60% of the 
distribution.  Therefore, given the larger, non-arbitrary and more robust 
results of the sample presented in Table 1, as well as the importance of full-
time labor market income to proxy socio-economic status, we proceed with 
the analysis acknowledging the downward longevity bias and eagerly await 
more waves of the HRS. 
 
B.  RETIREMENT DISTRIBUTION BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC 
CATEGORIES 
 
 In our sample, 725 people retired and died with an average 
retirement time of 8.7 years.  This group retired at ages 4.5 months (0.38 of 
a year) older than the average of all the 5,557 retirees.  Table 2 displays 
retirement age, death age and retirement time by sex, race, pension 
coverage, and health status.  The subgroup sizes are listed below the mean 
value.  The last column reports the retirement age of those who died, which 
are the individuals for whom we calculate their retirement time. 
  
                                                                                                                                
52 Approximately one-third of this sample of persons aged sixty or older had 
an annual labor market income of under $4,500 since, in this case, labor market 
income is not restricted to full-time workers. 
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Table 2: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Demographics 
 
Subgroups 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
Death Age 
 
Retirement 
Time 
 
Retirement 
Age 
(Deceased) 
All 
62.10 67.86 8.715 62.48 
5,557 1,418 725 
Women 
62.05 66.86 8.46 62.75 
2,535 475 216 
Men 
62.14 68.37 8.823 62.37 
3,022 943 509 
Nonwhite 
61.6 66.61 9.111 61.02 
1,002 285 141 
White 
62.2 68.18 8.619 62.83 
4,555 1,133 584 
No Pension in 
1992 63.21 68.2 8.325 63.38 
 986 342 173 
Has Pension in 
1992 62.05 67.93 8.431 61.74 
 2,755 627 393 
Health: Good 
to Poor 
62.02 67.30 8.454 62.44 
2,319 800 397 
Health: 
Excellent to 
Very Good
62.15 68.59 9.03 62.52 
3,238 618 328 
 
Although men and women retire at roughly the same age (62.14 
and 62.05, respectively), the 509 retired men who died had over four extra 
months of retirement time than did the 216 deceased women (8.82 versus 
8.46, respectively) because the men lived longer than the women who 
retired.  Also surprising, the non-white workers have half a year more of 
retirement time than white workers (9.11 versus 8.62) because they retired 
earlier, at age 61.6 compared to 62.2.  Since the number of observations 
differs for each variable, Table 2 lists the subgroup sizes below each 
group’s mean value.  The last column reports the retirement age of those 
who have died, which are the individuals for whom we calculate retirement 
time. 
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The difference in retirement age and death age between those with 
and without pensions was not significant.  Those without pensions had, on 
average, 8.32 years of retirement time compared to 8.43 years for those 
with access to pensions – a difference of about five weeks. 53  Not 
surprisingly those with self-described ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’ health had 
a mean 9.03 years in retirement time, whereas those with ‘good’, ‘fair’ or 
‘poor’ health had only 8.45 years of retirement time on average.54 Since the 
healthy and less healthy have approximately the same retirement age (62.52 
and 62.44, respectively), the difference in retirement time comes entirely 
from the healthier group’s longer-than-average lifespan (68.59 versus 
67.30). 
Now that we have presented differences by race, sex and health, we 
examine two income categories: 
 
(i) Respondents with income above and below the median full-
time labor market income $40,000, and; 
(ii) Respondents groups by full-time average real income 
quintiles.55 
 
The bottom 50% of income earners had an average retirement time 
of 9 years, which is significantly greater than the top half’s retirement time 
of 8.3 years, or 8.4 months more retirement time enjoyed by the lower 
income half of retired workers, as can be seen in Table 3.  Table 3 shows 
that this negative relation between income and retirement time is driven, to 
a significant extent, by the top and bottom quintiles which have an average 
of 7.4 and 10.2 years of retirement, respectively.  These extreme 
differences are not apparent between the second, third and fourth quintiles, 
which have retirement times of 8.4, 8.2 and 8.9 years, respectively.  These 
stark differences in retirement time are discussed further below, but first we 
                                                                                                                                
53 Although restricting this part to individuals in the 1992 HRS reduces our 
potential sample size, for these rows, only a very few individuals not in the 1992 
wave have pensions in later waves and have a valid retirement time. Thus, the 
substantive results are not affected by this restriction. 
54  The HRS question regarding personal health status is asked of each 
respondent in each wave. We have relied on an individual’s first reported personal 
health status – making it perhaps even more surprising that there is such a large 
division between the self-assessed healthy and unhealthy. We collapse the HRS’s 
five categories into a binary one for ease of analysis. 
55 The minimum average annual incomes to be included in each quintile are 
$0, $21,906.64, $33,362.48, $47,328.59 and $69,543.62. 
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consider the distribution of retirement time among income groups of men 
and women separately. 
 
Table 3: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Income 
Groups 
 
Subgroups 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
Death Age
 
Retirement 
Time 
 
Retirement 
Age 
(Deceased) 
Lower Half of 
Incomes 
62.55 68.27 9.04 62.86 
2,668 776 384 
Upper Half of 
Incomes 
61.67 67.37 8.348 62.05 
 2,889 642 341 
Bottom 20% 
62.4 69.04 10.16 62.84 
1,065 340 164 
20-40% 
62.52 68.02 8.367 63.22 
1,070 293 145 
40-60% 
62.61 67.21 8.229 62.68 
1,106 297 152 
60-80% 
61.32 67.41 8.934 61.36 
1,235 279 153 
Top 20% 
61.74 67.27 7.393 62.25 
1,081 209 111 
 
We find lower-income women and men retire at approximately the 
same age, 62.50 and 62.63, respectively.  While there is a larger gap 
(approximately seven months) between the retirement ages of higher-
income women (61.27) and men (61.87), higher earning individuals of both 
sexes retire at earlier ages than their lower-income counterparts, as shown 
in Table 4.  Yet, this equality between the sexes in retirement age does not 
carry over into retirement time.  Both upper- and lower-income women – 
for whom we can determine retirement time – have almost identical 
amounts of retirement time: 8.46 and 8.45 years, respectively.56 However, 
                                                                                                                                
56 It must be noted that at this level of data, parsing our cell counts (i.e., the 
number of observations per variable type) are approaching the limit of what can be 
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higher income men have nearly one year less of retirement time than lower 
income men.  The 281 higher-income males have an average of 8.33 years 
of retirement, whereas the 228 lower-income males have 9.43 years.  Thus, 
in contrast to our initial expectations, among retired workers, retirement 
time is not positively correlated with labor market income.  However, as 
demonstrated in Table 5, the “reverse inequality” result (i.e., the poor have 
more) is driven by including the richest and poorest quintiles of retired 
men. 
 
Table 4: Retirement Age and Time by Sex and Income Group 
 
 Women Men 
Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
 
No. Retired 1,596 939 1,072 1,950 
Mean Retirement Age 62.50 61.27 62.63 61.87 
Obs. Retirement Time 156 60 228 281 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.86 62.46 62.86 61.96 
Mean Retirement 
Time 8.464 8.450 9.434 8.327 
 
Restricting the sample to the middle 60% of the income 
distribution yields a different income and retirement time relationship than 
in the full sample.  Table 5 presents the same data as Table 4, but with the 
sample restricted to the middle 60% of the income distribution.  In the 
middle class, the lower income women work for a longer period of time: 
women in the lower half of the middle class retiree distribution retire a full 
year later than the upper middle-income class women (62.4 years versus 
61.4 years).  For men, the 1.2 years gap is even larger.  Lower-income, 
middle class men work until nearly age 63 and upper-income middle class 
men retire at age 61.8 years.  Furthermore, the difference in retirement time 
is positively related to income.  Men in the 50th to 80th percentile range 
                                                                                                                                
considered useful. The smallest cell counts are 60 and 49, which demand one to 
extrapolate the results with much caution. 
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have about 8.8 years of retirement, and their counterparts in the 20th to 
50th percentile range have less time in retirement, at an average of 8.5 
years.  Therefore, the negative relationship between retirement time and 
income class shown in Table 3 is driven entirely by the top 20% and 
bottom 20% of male income earners. 
 
 
We conclude that the anomalous results of retirement time – that 
the lower income fare better – for the full sample is driven in particular by 
the extreme experiences of men in the top 20% and bottom 20% of the 
income distribution.  As discussed, the top 50% and bottom 50% of 
females have near-identical retirement time.  Yet, Table 5 reveals that this 
similarity evaporates for the middle 60% of women.  The upper-half of 
middle income women have 8.8 years of retirement time, while the lower-
half of middle income women have 7.7 years of retirement time.  Note the 
observations are small – involving eighty-five and forty-nine women, 
respectively.  Nevertheless, these observations are numerically important in 
calculating average retirement times (insofar as they represent a sizeable 
portion of the total retirement time sample).  Therefore, these data for 
women reinforce the conclusion that it is the top and bottom quintiles of 
men, specifically, which account for the entirety of the negative relation 
between income and retirement time. 
Table 5: Middle Income Retirees -- 60% of Distribution -- 
Retirement Age and Time by Gender and Income Group 
 Women Men 
Binary Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
No. Retired 920 716 683 1,092 
Mean Retirement Age 62.42 61.41 62.98 61.78 
Obs. Retirement Time 85 49 135 181 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.54 62.48 63.08 61.81 
Mean Retirement 
Time 7.727 8.825 8.503 8.805 
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Next we consider the income class differences according to the 
health status of respondents. 57  When the bottom and top quintiles are 
included, lower-income individuals, regardless of health, garner more 
retirement time than their higher-income counterparts (8.7 versus 8.1 for 
poorer health individuals; 9.4 versus 8.6 for healthier individuals) even 
though lower income individuals retire later – at ages 62.4 for the less 
healthy and 62.7 for the healthier – than the higher income individuals, at 
ages 61.5 and 61.7, respectively.  Note that the retirement time benefit from 
being healthy is larger for of the lower half of retirees (0.72 years) than 
wealthier retirees (0.52 years).  Overall we confirm, in Table 6, that health 
status is a key driver of retirement time: healthier individuals, regardless of 
income, enjoy more time in retirement than their unhealthy counterparts. 
 
Table 6: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income 
Group in the Full Sample 
Health  Good, Fair, Poor   Excellent, Very good 
Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
No. Retired 1,298 1,021 1,370 1,868 
Mean Retirement Age 62.42 61.51 62.68 61.76 
Obs. Retirement Time 222 175 162 166 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.78 62.02 62.97 62.09 
Mean Retirement Time 8.736 8.095 9.456 8.615 
 
Excluding the extreme 20% at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution, we see, in Table 7, that healthy and/or wealthy individuals 
share approximately equal retirement times.  Among the lower-income 
middle class, healthier retirees have nearly a full year more of retirement 
                                                                                                                                
57 The cross tabulation of retirement time by income class and race does not 
provide further insights beyond what has been discussed above: nonwhites have 
more retirement time than whites, and in both cases, the relation is negatively 
associated with income class for the full sample and positively associated with the 
restricted, middle 60% sample. More importantly, we do not include these results 
here because the cell counts for nonwhites becomes unjustifiably small in both 
cases. 
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time (8.7 years) than the less healthy lower-income middle class (7.8 
years).  However, the retirement time differential among the upper-income 
middle class is insignificant at a mere 0.09 years (although this happens to 
be in favor of the less healthy).  Moreover, these retirement time figures for 
the upper half of income earners are nearly equal to that of the healthy but 
poor segment of the middle class.  Thus, among the middle 60% of the 
distribution, it is only the unhealthy, lower middle class that is at a 
significant disadvantage in obtaining retirement time. 
 
 
Before moving to the regression analysis, we provide a brief 
explanation of the observed biasness of our sample.  If an individual 
entered the HRS in the first survey wave in 1992, they would have been 
followed for eighteen years (1992 through 2010).  Many individuals have 
simply not been a part of the survey long enough to have died.  Those who 
have died, and for whom we calculate a retirement time, are those from 
groups with lower-than-average life expectancy.  Since it is well 
documented that longevity is positively correlated with income, the people 
who died are more likely to be lower income workers.  Moreover, since 
longevity is normally distributed, the HRS data captures a disproportionate 
share of lower-income individuals’ left tail of their death age distribution, 
relative to the death age distribution of higher income individuals.  That is, 
because the average death age of wealthier individuals is higher, we 
observed a smaller segment of this distribution’s left tail. 
Table 7: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income 
Group Middle 60% of Distribution 
Health Good, Fair or Poor Excellent/Very good 
Income Class Lower Half 
Upper 
Half 
Lower 
Half 
Upper 
Half 
No. Retired 754 704 849 1,104 
Mean Retirement Age 62.47 61.66 62.82 61.62 
Obs. Retirement Time 124 122 96 108 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.56 61.61 63.28 62.34 
Mean Retirement 
Time 7.79 8.85 8.74 8.76 
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This assessment is borne out in the data present in Tables 8 and 9.  
The middle three quintiles have roughly equivalent rates of death (12.1%, 
12.3% and 11.6%), whereas 14.13% of the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution died compared to a mere 8.69% of the top 20%.  Further, far 
more men (15.2%), than women (8.14%) have died.  The sex disparity, in 
fact, is larger than the difference between the very healthy individuals who 
died (8.9%) and the proportion of deceased people with worse health 
(15.6%) as seen in Table 8.  Each of the large differences – between 
women and men, health status and the top and bottom 20% of the income 
distribution – are associated with unexpected outcomes in the distribution 
of retirement time.  These rates of death support our focus on the middle 
60% of the income distribution.  Moreover, given the near-equal death rates 
among the middle three quintiles, this middle class is likely more 
representative of the true population.  In other words, the middle class 
subset is a reasonable representation of retirement times. 
 
Table 8: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death 
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Full Sample 
   
Proportion 
Dead 
 
Deceased Individuals with a Retirement 
Time Value 
 
   No. 
Deceased
Mean 
Death 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Time 
Gender 
Women 8.14% 216 71.21 62.75 8.460 
Men 15.22% 509 71.19 62.37 8.823 
Health 
Status 
Good - Poor 15.63% 397 70.90 62.44 8.454 
Excellent -
Very Good 8.94% 328 71.56 62.52 9.030 
Income 
Group 
Lower Half 12.89% 384 71.90 62.86 9.040 
Upper Half 10.67% 341 70.40 62.05 8.348 
Income 
Quintile 
Bottom 20% 14.13% 164 73.00 62.84 10.160 
20-40% 12.17% 145 71.58 63.22 8.367 
40-60% 12.35% 152 70.91 62.68 8.229 
60-80% 11.59% 153 70.30 61.36 8.934 
Top 20% 8.69% 111 69.64 62.25 7.393 
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However, the final two rows of Table 9 show that the lower death 
rate variation among the middle class does not hold across gender and 
health categories.  The proportion of deceased men (16.5%) is still far 
greater than that of women (7.7%), as is the proportion of the deceased who 
reported poorer health (16.0%) over those who reported being healthy 
(9.1%).  As a result, we are unable to entirely eliminate all biasness in 
health and gender dimensions, even though we have eliminated the bias for 
income groups.  Therefore, in the regression analysis, we look at both the 
full sample and the middle 60% subsample to provide some early insights 
into the state of retirement in America. 
 
Table 9: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death 
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Middle Class (Middle Three 
Quintiles) 
 
  Proportion 
Dead 
Deceased Individuals with a Retirement 
Time Value 
  
 
No. 
Deceased
Mean 
Death 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Time 
Gender 
Women 7.66% 134 70.65 62.52 8.129 
Men 16.52% 316 71.03 62.36 8.676 
Health 
Status 
Good - Poor 16.00% 246 70.41 62.09 8.314 
Excellent - 
Very Good 9.08% 204 71.53 62.78 8.753 
Income 
Group 
Lower 
Half 12.07% 220 71.08 62.87 8.203 
Upper Half 12.00% 230 70.77 61.96 8.809 
 
D.   REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Using an ordinary least squares regression on the full sample, we 
find higher income reduces retirement time, retirement age, and death age.  
In fact, average full-time labor market income is the only significant 
variable in each of the three regressions.  Note income and retirement age 
are negatively correlated: higher income people work longer.  That higher 
income individuals remain longer in the workforce explains much of the 
anomalous results that higher income workers have less retirement time. 
After controlling for income and health, men still have more 
retirement time than women, but the difference is not statistically 
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significant.  Healthier individuals, after controlling for sex and income, die 
1.36 years later and the result is highly significant (p-value ൌ 0).  The age 
of death, seen in the final column of Table 10, is negatively correlated with 
income.  Thus, as expected from the cross tabulations, the top 20% of this 
sample tend to retire older and die a bit sooner. 
 
Table 10: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender 
and Health Status 
Full Sample (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement 
Time 
Retirement 
Age 
Death Age 
    
Average Full-time 
Labor Market Income 
(Thousands of 2008 $) 
-0.0116** -0.00333** -0.0109** 
(0.00471) (0.00157) (0.00488) 
Gender 
(Male = 1; 
Female = 0) 
0.577 0.167 1.721*** 
(0.468) (0.154) (0.433) 
Health Status 
(Excellent/ V. Good = 
1; 
Good to Poor = 0) 
0.604 0.168 1.358*** 
(0.422) (0.153) (0.403) 
Constant 8.576*** 62.07*** 66.62*** 
(0.455) (0.151) (0.412) 
 
Observations 725 5,557 1,418 
R-squared 0.012 0.001 0.019 
 
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Working past age sixty-five is correlated with higher income and 
earlier death in the full sample, but not for the middle class sample, 
represented in Table 11.  Labor market income is now associated with more 
retirement time, which confirms the findings from the simple cross 
tabulations.  For the middle class, every $10,000 of labor market income 
increases retirement time by 0.139 years (approximately 6 weeks).  
Unfortunately, with the reduced sample size, from 725 observations in the 
full sample in Table 10, to 450 in middle class sample in Table 11, the 
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coefficient on retirement time is not statistically significant.  Nevertheless, 
the negative relationship between retirement age and labor market income 
is significant in this sub-sample regression.  Therefore, although this 
second regression loses some of its explanatory power compared to the full 
sample regression, it supports the hypothesis that, for now, the U.S. 
retirement system enables lower income individuals to obtain retirement 
time on an equal basis by enabling them to overcome their shorter life 
expectancy through earlier retirement. 
 
Table 11: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender 
and Health Status 
Middle 60% (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement 
Time 
Retirement 
Age 
Death Age 
    
Average Full-time Labor 
Market Income 
(Thousands of 2008 $) 
0.0139 -0.0464*** -0.0344* 
(0.0184) (0.00692) (0.0192) 
Gender 
(Male = 1; 
Female = 0) 
0.497 0.522*** 1.488*** 
(0.521) (0.180) (0.529) 
Health Status 
(Excellent/ V. Good = 1; 
Good to Poor = 0) 
0.441 0.197 1.519*** 
(0.471) (0.179) (0.491) 
Constant 7.382*** 63.70*** 67.31*** 
(0.846) (0.312) (0.857) 
 
Observations 450 3,411 869 
R-squared 0.006 0.014 0.020 
 
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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IV.  INCOME INEQUALITY AMONG OLDER WORKERS IS 
GETTING WORSE58 
 
Finding that the U.S. retirement system equalizes retirement time is 
in sharp contrast to the growing inequality of income over the past two 
decades.  Using the same data set, we find the income distribution for full-
time workers and their households has become more unequal.  In 1992, 
looking at Table 12, the mean full-time labor market income of middle-
income earners (i.e., those in the third quintile – the 40th to 60th percentile) 
was 31.7% of the average full-time labor market income of those in the top 
quintile.59 By 2010, the middle quintile of workers’ average income was 
only a quarter (25.3%) of the average income of the top 20%.  The 
disparities in median incomes also grew.  In 1992, the middle-quintile’s 
median income was 40.7% of that in the top quintile; by 2010, the median 
middle-income individual had only one-third (33.3%) of the top 20%’s 
median income. 
 
Table 12:  Ratio of Third Quintile (40-60%) to Fifth Quintile (80-
100%) of Full-time Labor Market Income 
Year of HRS 
Sample Quintile’s Mean Income Quintile’s Median Income 
1992 31.7% 40.7% 
1994 31.5% 41.8% 
1996 32.1% 40.8% 
1998 28.2% 35.9% 
2000 29.8% 37.3% 
2002 27.9% 33.3% 
2004 27.3% 34.7% 
2006 26.4% 35.0% 
2008 26.8% 34.5% 
2010 25.3% 33.3% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
58 See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57. 
59 Note that these figures for the distribution of full-time income come from 
the entire full-time workers sample in the HRS and thus are not subject to the 
sample bias that exists when restricting the sample retirees or the deceased. 
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V.  RETIREMENT TIME EQUALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RETIREMENT AGE POLICIES 
 
This study aimed to uncover retirement trends hidden by averages.  
That the average American man is retiring earlier and living longer hides 
the potential erosion in a major social accomplishment: Social Security, 
Medicare, and pension programs allow rich, middle class, and low income 
workers alike to retire before they die. 
The lowest income groups in this sample are retiring early, while 
others in the middle class are working longer and not enjoying as rapid 
improvements in longevity.  This means retirement time could grow more 
unequal by social economic class if the age at which Social Security 
beneficiaries collect full Social Security benefits is raised.  It is a mistake to 
assume that the facts that Americans are living longer and that Americans 
are retiring earlier are not connected.  Retirement improves health, 
especially for men, so if people work longer, longevity improvements 
could decrease and access to retirement time could decrease as well.60 
Reforming policies regarding one aspect of aging (e.g., retirement time) 
because of changes in the average of another (e.g., death age) is, therefore, 
ill advised. 
It is well documented that the average American’s life expectancy 
has increased markedly since World War II.61 The average American born 
in 1950 lived to 68 years old.62  By 1980, life expectancy at birth had 
increased to 73.9 years and to then nearly 78 years by 2007. 63  These 
remarkable increases hide a growing disparity of life expectancies among 
different socio-economic groups.  Longevity has not improved equally for 
all Americans.  Life expectancy for those in the top half of the income 
distribution has improved much more than for those in the bottom half.64 
Stunningly, this increasing inequality of outcomes has occurred with 
remarkable speed.  For example, the Inter-American Development Bank 
                                                                                                                                
60 See Kevin Neuman, Quit Your Job and Get Healthier? The Effect of 
Retirement on Health, 29 J. LAB. RES., 177–201 (2008). 
61 Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930-2010, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html. 
62 Id. 
63 Arias, supra note 3, at 48. 
64 See Cristia, supra note 3. 
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estimates that from the 1983-1997 period to the 1998-2003 period,65 The 
differences in life expectancy between the highest 20% and lowest earning 
20% of Americans (for those ages 35-76) grew from 0.7 to 1.5 years among 
women, and from 2.7 years to 3.6 years among men.66 
To explain the growing disparities in longevity, other studies have 
sought to isolate a broader range of socio-economic variables.  Education is 
a driving force behind longevity and mortality differentials.67 Waldron, an 
economist, finds income is the driving force, though she did not have data 
on education.68 Specifically, differentials in life expectancy among race-sex 
groups (at age twenty-five) remained constant from 1990 to 2000, but that 
differences significantly increase between high- and low-education 
groups.69 Lower-educated women (both white and black) had a statistically 
significant lower average life expectancy in 2000, compared to better-
educated women than they did in 1990.70 
What are the implications for retirement policy?  The evidence 
suggests that raising the retirement age and implementing other policies 
that encourage longer working lives may actually reverse longevity gains, 
so that higher labor incomes may result in a decrease in retirement time.  
Raising the normal retirement age in Social Security, which is equivalent to 
cutting benefits for workers, will reduce income for any person in a group 
that tends to leave the labor force early to compensate for a lower life 
expectancy.  Higher income people also obtain more years of life, but the 
inequality of life expectancy can be counterbalanced by a well-designed 
pension system that allows lower income and lower educated workers to 
collect pensions or disability benefits earlier than higher income and higher 
educated individuals.  On the other hand, pension systems that encourage 
lower-income, lower-educated people to work longer will create unequal 
distributions of retirement time. 
In sum, sex and health are important factors in predicting who will 
have more or less retirement time, but economic class is a key factor.  If 
                                                                                                                                
65 These periods were chosen so that the sizes of the two groups considered 
were approximately equal. 
66 Cristia, supra note 3, at 20, 29-30. 
67 See Ellen R. Meara et al., The Gap gets Bigger: Changes in Mortality and 
Life Expectancy, by Education, 1981-2000, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 350 (2008). 
68 See Hilary Waldron, Trends in Mortality Differentials and Life Expectancy 
for Male Social Security-Covered Workers by Socioeconomic Status, 67 SOC. SEC. 
BULL., no. 3, 2007. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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lower socio-economic status individuals are forced to delay retirement 
because private and/or public pension payments shrink, then retirement 
time is bound to become more unequal. 
 
Appendix A: Longevity at various ages, by race71 
 
Table A: Longevity at Various Ages from 1980-2010, by Race 
 White Male White Female Black Male Black Female 
At birth 8.2% 4.1% 12.5% 7.6% 
At 65 years 25.4% 10.3% 22.3% 14.9% 
At 75 years 25.0% 11.3% 22.9% 16.8% 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
71 See ROBERT D. GROVE & ALICE M. HETZEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., 
& WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1960 (1968), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/vsrates1940_60.pdf; ELIZABETH 
ARIAS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES BY 
HISPANIC ORIGIN (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/ 
sr_02/sr02_152.pdf; Sherry L. Murphy, et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 
1, 3, 18-21, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchc/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf. 
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Appendix B: Definition Variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Stata code Explanation Other Notes 
Entry Age Y_age Age of respondent when 
he/she first enters the HRS 
survey. 
Here ‘age’ is simply 
the difference 
between year of birth 
and survey year 
Death Age death_age Difference between 
year/month of death and 
year/month of birth.  
Month’s (1=January; 12 = 
December) are divided by 
12 and added/subtracted 
from the difference in 
years 
HRS 2010 Tracker 
data. 
 
HRS records year of 
death and then 
verifies with CDC 
mortality tables. 
Retirement 
Age 
ret_age Difference between 
year/month of stated date 
of retirement and 
year/month of birth 
Year and month of 
retirement is asked if 
retired `year’ == 1 
(see below) 
Disabled 
Age 
dis_age Difference between 
year/month of stated date 
of when a disability 
(keeping one from work) 
began and year/month of 
birth 
 
Time in
Retirement 
ret_time Difference between 
retirement or disabled age 
and death age.  If 
respondent has both a 
retirement and disability 
age, retirement age is used. 
 
Retired retired{`year
’} or retired 
(0 = not 
retired; 
1 = retired) 
Based on the respondents 
labor force status (reported 
in each survey), he/she is 
considered retired only if 
the first/primary response 
is “retired”.   Therefore a 
respondent may be coded 
as 1 for several survey 
years – and may switch to 
and from retirement. 
Each respondent with 
retired `year’ == 1 
also states a year and 
month of retirement.  
For the calculations 
of retirement time 
and age we take the 
mostly recently 
reported retirement 
year and month. 
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Individual 
Income 
inc{`year’} Annual income from 
wages, salaries and 
business. 
Positive values only. 
RAND income and 
wealth files, 1992 
through 2010. (e.g., 
r1iearn) 
Average 
Real 
Income 
avg_inc_r Constructed by adjusting 
individual incomes by CPI 
to 2010 US dollars. 
 
Average is constructed as 
the mean for each 
individuals across the 
survey years they report an 
individual income 
CPI adjustment 
figures are taken 
from IPUMS CPS 
(CPI99) 
 
The variable is 
restricted to full-time 
income only (35+ 
hr/wk; 40+ wk/yr) 
Top Half / 
Bottom 
Half 
avg_topbotto
m (0 = 
bottom; 1 = 
top) 
Binary value assigned to 
each respondent based on 
whether their average real 
income is above or below 
of the median income 
The median average 
income is the median 
Income 
Quintile 
avg_quint 
(1 = poorest 
20%; 
5 = richest 
20%) 
Same as Top / Bottom, but 
dividing individuals into 5 
income groups rather than 
2. 
Cut off points are 
based on average real 
income 
Sex/Gender GENDER 
(0 = Woman; 
1 = Man) 
 HRS 2010 Tracker 
data 
White/Non-
White 
white 
(0 = not 
white; 
1 = white) 
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DESPERATE RETIREES: THE PERPLEXING CHALLENGE 
OF COVERING RETIREMENT HEALTH CARE COSTS 
 IN A YOYO WORLD 
 
RICHARD L. KAPLAN* 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the challenges that retirees face when it comes to 
selecting and paying for the proper healthcare coverage post retirement.  
The author examines the rising cost of healthcare as well as the 
complexities of Medicare plans that often make up a retiree’s healthcare 
coverage package.  The author concludes that most retirees are not 
prepared to pay for healthcare in their retirement years. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
That retirement formulas and templates of earlier times have little 
relevance to today’s retirees is a vast understatement.  In virtually every 
significant aspect of retirement planning, it is a brand new ball game, and 
almost every change has spawned increasing uncertainty, unpredictability, 
and anxiety for persons affected by these changes.  To encapsulate the 
direction of these massive changes, I have resorted to a four-letter acronym, 
YOYO, which stands for You’re On Your Own.1 Quite bluntly, retirees and 
prospective retirees are now the locus of increasing risks relating to 
retirement security,2 and the foreseeable trends suggest that this situation 
will only exacerbate in the future. 
                                                                                                                                      
* Peer and Sarah Pedersen Professor of Law, University of Illinois. This article 
was prepared for the Symposium on “The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined 
Contribution World” that was held at the University of Connecticut School of Law 
on April 5, 2013. 
1 To be sure, there is a whole sub-industry of advice-providers seeking to 
assist individuals with the financial aspects of retirement. See, e.g., WALL ST. J., 
May 13, 2013, at C7 (full-page advertisement showcasing twenty-five “best selling 
authors” on this topic from a single publisher).  
2 See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security 
Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2004). See generally EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, 
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Rather than try to consider all of these changes, I will explore 
instead just one very important, but largely neglected, component of the 
increasingly desperate condition in which today’s retirees find themselves – 
namely, covering the cost of health care during their retirement.  The 
significance of this issue is captured by the most recent Health Confidence 
Survey that was reported this past January.3 An analysis of that Survey by 
the Employee Benefit Research Institute concluded that “[t]he percentage 
of Americans reporting that health expenses are an important consideration 
when planning for retirement has always been relatively high, and it has 
recently increased.”4 The survey results for the most recent three years are 
summarized in the following table:5 
 
Percent of Respondents Citing Medical Expenses as  
Extremely or Very Important in Planning for Retirement 
 2010 2011 2012 
 
Extremely Important 
 
38 37 45 
Very Important 
 
31 33 26 
Total 69 70 71 
 
Paying for one’s health care is, of course, a major issue throughout 
a person’s life, but many people were able to ignore the fundamental 
necessity of securing health insurance until they retire, because their 
employers typically provided health insurance as part of their compensation 
package.6 While the specific components of such coverage undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                      
THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA (2007). 
3 Paul Fronstin, Views on Health Coverage and Retirement: Findings from the 
2012 Health Confidence Survey, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST. NOTES, Jan. 2013 at 2, 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_01_Jan-13_HCS-TxEx 
ps3.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 5, fig.3. 
6 See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health 
Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 535, 537–40 (2005). 
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changed over the years, the essential availability and general contours of 
such coverage were generally not a major concern.  Employers negotiated 
with health care providers or insurers, designing one or more packages of 
benefits that they thought their employees might want, handled much of the 
attendant paperwork in administering the plan, and facilitated enrollment 
via their payroll systems.7 Such employer involvement, if not beneficence, 
basically disappears once a person retires.  As a result, the financial context 
of health care coverage that retirees confront is fundamentally different 
than what they had when they were working. 
The nature of this contrast can be described in overview as follows: 
wage earners received periodic income, increased irregularly for reasons of 
inflation or career advancement, with income taxes withheld from each 
payment,8 along with health insurance for themselves and their dependents. 
Classic pension schemes based on defined benefit plans9 self-consciously 
sought to mimic this basic pattern, though usually without any scheduled 
increases in payment amounts.  That is, traditional pensions and retirement 
annuities provide periodic income, with income taxes withheld from each 
payment,10 but no increases for inflation once they commence.  But the 
bigger difference is that most retirees cannot look to their former employer 
for coverage of their health care expenses.  As I have noted elsewhere,11 
retiree health benefits are provided by fewer employers every year, and the 
benefits that are provided are diminished regularly. Accordingly, 
employees who had been largely sheltered from the chore of securing 
coverage for unexpected health care costs must become their own human 
resources counselors upon retirement.  They must learn how to navigate a 
very different health care system, one that was assembled over several 
decades with no coherent vision and with precious little regard to consumer 
friendliness.  
Fidelity Investments, the major financial services provider, has 
estimated that a retired couple aged sixty-five years is likely to need nearly 
                                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 540–41; see also David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for 
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23 
(2001). 
8 I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
9 See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 361–64 (5th ed. 2010).  
10 I.R.C. § 3405(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
11 See generally Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious 
Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 287 (2009). 
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a quarter of a million dollars to pay for their health care costs in 
retirement.12 This estimate is necessarily an average figure, and many 
retirees will need substantially more funds for this essential retirement 
outlay.  Much depends upon how long a specific individual lives, that 
person’s health status, the nature and extent of health care that that person 
receives, and the rate of health care cost inflation, among other factors.  A 
careful simulation by the Employee Benefit Research Institute determined 
that a sixty-five year old man would need savings of $135,000 to 
$185,000,13 depending on the extent of his prescription drug usage, and a 
sixty-five year old female would require $154,000 to $210,000.14 These 
projections cover anticipated Medicare premiums, deductibles, and co-
payment or cost-sharing obligations as well as the cost of certain 
supplementary arrangements.  They do not, however, include the cost of 
long-term care.15 But the basic point is that retirees face a large and 
unpredictable liability in retirement for their health care expenses.  That 
such a prospect is foisted on retirees in a “You’re On Your Own” world 
makes retirement security – the theme of this Symposium – especially 
problematic. 
 
II. MEDICARE ELIGIBILITY 
 
Many workers, and much of the public as well, have the mistaken 
impression that upon retirement, their health care cost concerns are over 
because they can now access the federal government’s Medicare program.  
But Medicare is no walk in the park in terms of understandability or 
internal consistency, and it is not generally available to retirees who have 
not yet reached the statutory eligibility age of sixty-five years.16  This is a 
very important point because many Americans retire before that age, not 
always as a matter of choice.  In fact, most retirees begin collecting Social 
                                                                                                                                      
12 FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, THE INCREASING COST OF HEALTH 
CARE UPON RETIREMENT (2012), available at 
http://workplace.fidelity.com/sites/default /files/FF_TBO_IncreasingCostofHC.pdf 
(projecting required savings at $240,000). 
13 Paul Fronstin et al., Savings Needed for Health Expenses for People Eligible 
for Medicare: Some Rare Good News, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Oct. 2012, 
at 2, 4, available at http://www.ebri.org/ pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_10_Oct-12. 
HlthSvg-IRAs.pdf. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (2006). 
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Security retirement benefits before reaching age sixty-five, and a majority 
do so as early as age sixty-two.17  These “early” retirees cannot, however, 
access Medicare before age sixty-five unless they satisfy the Social 
Security program’s functionality-based criteria for being “disabled”  
namely, that they are unable to perform “any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”18 
Moreover, they must have received disability payments under this standard 
for twenty-four months before they become eligible for Medicare 
coverage.19 If they cannot qualify under these requirements, they must wait 
until their sixty-fifth birthday to enroll in Medicare and therefore must 
secure health insurance from some other source before then.20  
Proposals were made near the end of the Clinton Administration to 
allow retirees who were not yet sixty-five years old to buy into Medicare at 
actuarially fair prices, but those proposals were soon eclipsed by the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal and the ensuing presidential impeachment 
battle.21 The last time this issue was seriously considered was in the context 
of the major health care reform legislation enacted during President 
Obama’s first term,22 known variously as the Affordable Care Act or 
ObamaCare.23 That legislation actually jettisoned the prospect of early-
access Medicare in favor of universally available health insurance 
exchanges that are scheduled to begin next year.24 Although the new law 
did include a very modest program to subsidize employers that maintained 
                                                                                                                                      
17 See Dan Muldoon & Richard W. Kopcke, Are People Claiming Social 
Security Benefits Later?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES., JUNE 2008 at 1, 2, available 
at http:// crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/ib_8-7.pdf. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
19 Id. §§ 426(b)(2)(A)(i), 1395c(2). 
20 See Kaplan et al., supra note 11, at 336–37 (explaining the possible 
availability of “continuation” coverage from a former employer under certain 
specified circumstances). 
21 See id. at 343. 
22 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
23 See Richard L. Kaplan, Analyzing the Impact of the New Health Care 
Reform Legislation on Older Americans, 18 ELDER L.J. 213, 213–14 (2011). 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1311(b), 124 
Stat. 119, 173 (2010)). 
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their existing health insurance programs for pre-Medicare retirees,25 that 
program disappears entirely in 201426 when the state-organized health 
insurance exchanges will presumably be operational.27  
In any case, if Medicare’s eligibility age is reconsidered amidst the 
current efforts to tackle America’s long-term fiscal dilemma, it is more 
likely that this age will be raised then lowered.  Indeed, coordinating 
Medicare’s eligibility age with Social Security’s age for full retirement 
benefits has been seriously considered for some time.28 That change would 
boost Medicare’s eligibility age to sixty-six currently and eventually to 
sixty-seven.29  For what it’s worth, if Medicare’s eligibility age of sixty-
five were adjusted for changes in life expectancy that have occurred since 
the program was enacted, it would be seventy-three years.30 The bottom 
line is that retirees who are not yet sixty-five years old cannot enroll in 
Medicare, presently or in the foreseeable future. 
 
III. MEDICARE’S COVERAGE COMPONENTS 
 
Retirees who can enroll in Medicare confront an uncoordinated 
“system” of separate coverages and confusing options that does not 
correspond even remotely to what they had during their working lives.  The 
elemental separation of Medicare’s disparate coverages into hospital costs 
(Part A), physicians’ charges (Part B), and prescription drug expenses (Part 
D) is unfathomable to new retirees who are accustomed to the all-inclusive 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Under this program, the federal government paid eighty percent of claims 
for medical services costing between $15,000 and $90,000 that were incurred 
between June 22, 2010 and December 31, 2013. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(c)(2), (3) 
(Supp. IV 2007-2011) (enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1102(c)(2), (3), 124 Stat. 119, 145 (2010)). The 
maximum benefit per claim, in other words, was $60,000 (maximum claim of 
$75,000 × 80%). Among other limitations, this program had a global budget cap of 
$5 billion, after which no further claims were payable. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(e). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 18002(a)(1). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b). 
28 See Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
777, 791–92. 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1) (2006). 
30 Life expectancy when Medicare was created (1965) was 70.2 years and was 
78.7 years in 2010.  Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, INFO. 
PLEASE (2011), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html. Therefore, 78.7 ÷ 
70.2 =  1.12108 × 65 = 72.9 years. 
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health care plans that characterize the modern workplace.  To be fair, when 
Medicare was created in 1965, its designers self-consciously mimicked the 
“major medical” plans that private health insurance companies were then 
offering.31 But those plans evolved over time, while Medicare’s 
fundamental organizational components have not.  As a result, a newly 
retired person faces a program that seems designed for a time long ago and 
in fact was. 
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of this programmatic 
ossification involves prescription drugs.  When Medicare was created in 
1965, such medications were few and relatively inexpensive and were used 
primarily to treat specific maladies over very short time courses.  In the 
ensuing decades, however, pharmacological innovations have brought forth 
a veritable cornucopia of amazing treatments that control and ameliorate a 
wide range of common chronic conditions including heart disease, 
hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, asthma, osteoporosis, and the like.  These 
drug regimens are not cheap and generally must be followed for the rest of 
a patient’s life, but they extend people’s lives and improve the quality of 
the lives they live.  Yet, by the time that Medicare was changed to cover 
outpatient prescription drugs, it was the only health care insurance program 
in the country that lacked such coverage – a situation that typifies the 
anachronistic nature of Medicare’s basic structure. 
 
IV. MEDICARE’S COST EXPOSURES  
 
Unbeknownst to most pre-retirees, Medicare is not a 
comprehensive health care plan.32 It exposes its beneficiaries to a dizzying 
array of deductibles and co-payments that can be understood only as 
historical accidents lacking any sense of medical coherence.  
 
A. HOSPITALS 
 
Medicare Part A covers most of a retiree’s hospital costs for up to 
sixty days in a single “spell of illness” after payment of a per-admission 
deductible.33 A “spell of illness” for this purpose begins with the admission 
                                                                                                                                      
31 See THE CENTURY FOUND., MEDICARE TOMORROW: THE REPORT OF THE 
CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON MEDICARE REFORM 47 (2001). 
32 See Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 10–11 
(2012). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(b) (2006). 
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and ends sixty days after the patient has been discharged.34  Although a per-
admission deductible is a fairly common feature in health care plans, it 
usually is much lower; e.g., $250.  That is not the case with Medicare.  The 
per-admission deductible in 2014 is $1,216,35 and it increases every year 
based on increases in health care costs generally.  Moreover, retirees tend 
to use more health care services than the general population and could 
conceivably face two or even three hospitalizations in the same calendar 
year. 
For example, a retiree might be hospitalized on January 14, 
discharged two weeks later, and then readmitted in May and perhaps in 
October as well.  If that happened, this retiree would be liable for the per-
admission deductible twice or even three times that year.  In this context, it 
is extremely important to note that Medicare has no annual stop-loss 
provisions that cap an enrollee’s out-of-pocket costs once that person’s 
expenditures reach some pre-determined amount36 – again unlike many, if 
not most, health care plans that are available today to the pre-Medicare 
population. 
Medicare Part A also has a durational limitation on hospital stays 
that reflects its generally out-of-date orientation.  Medicare covers virtually 
all costs for up to sixty days and then covers costs in excess of a daily 
deductible for an additional thirty days within the same “spell of illness.”37 
That per-day deductible is adjusted annually and in 2014 is $304.38 The 
resulting cost exposure, however, is fairly inconsequential because a 
hospital stay exceeding sixty days is very uncommon, especially after the 
Diagnostic Range Groupings were implemented in 1987.39 These groupings 
limit how many hospital days Medicare will pay for specific treatments and 
as a result, the average hospital stay of a person age sixty-five and older is 
less than six days, according to the most recent data available.40   
                                                                                                                                      
34 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006). 
35Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV, 
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-
glance.html#collapse-4811 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
36 Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, The Insurance Value of Medicare, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1773, 1773 (2012). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006). 
38 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
39 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?, 162–64 (1997). 
40 See ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A 
PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2012 13 (2013), available at 
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B. NURSING HOMES 
 
Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing home care is far more 
restrictive than its coverage of hospital charges but is similarly time-
warped.  Nursing home costs are covered by Medicare for the first twenty 
days within a “spell of illness,”41 and Medicare then pays all costs beyond a 
per-day deductible,42 which in 2014 is $152.43 This extended coverage, 
however, cannot exceed eighty days,44 so Medicare’s coverage stops after 
one hundred days in a nursing home.  This coverage design may have been 
appropriate when Medicare was created in 1965, when most people did not 
live long enough to develop conditions like Alzheimer’s Disease, which 
can require care in a nursing facility for three to five years or longer.  But 
today, the majority of older residents in nursing homes have such 
conditions, and a result, Medicare’s one-hundred-day coverage limitation 
seems archaic, if not downright cruel.  
Moreover, even this limited coverage of nursing home costs is 
subject to a major and poorly understood overarching restriction – namely, 
that the patient requires and receives “skilled nursing care” on a daily 
basis45 for the same or a medically related condition that was treated 
previously in a hospital.46  Most retirees and their families do not realize 
that much of the care these facilities provide is actually lower-level 
“custodial care” rather than “skilled nursing care,” which typically entails 
injections, gastronomy feedings, catheters, administration of medical gases, 
and the like.47 Consequently, Medicare does not cover the cost of such care. 
Moreover, the prior hospitalization must have lasted at least three 
days48 and must have occurred within the thirty days preceding admission 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/aging_statistics/Profile/2012/docs/2012profile.pdf 
(reporting that persons aged sixty-five to seventy-four averaged stays of 5.4 days, 
persons aged seventy-five to eighty-four averaged 5.7 days, and persons aged 
eighty-five and over averaged 5.6 days). 
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(2)(A), 1395e(a)(3) (Supp. III 2007–2010). 
42 Id. § 1395e(a)(3). 
43 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 1395e(a)(3). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 2007-2010); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(1) 
(2012). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(2)(ii). 
47 42 C.F.R. § 409.33(a)-(c) (2012). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (2006). 
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to the nursing home.49 So, if a retiree enters a nursing home directly from 
her home, for example, Medicare does not cover any of the ensuing 
expenses. 
Adding insult to injury, the Diagnostic Range Groupings that 
reduced the number of days that Medicare would pay for hospital care 
effectively eliminated Medicare’s coverage of many nursing home stays.  
That is, when a hospital stay for a particular medical condition is shortened 
from three days to two days, a subsequent nursing home stay will not be 
covered by Medicare because of that program’s three-day minimum.50  The 
bottom line is that Medicare’s coverage of nursing home care is much more 
limited than it first appears, which means that retirees who require such 
facilities face considerable financial exposure for the cost of care they 
receive there.  In this context, it should be noted that Medicare provides no 
coverage whatsoever for care in assisted living facilities, largely because 
those institutions did not exist when Medicare was created. 
 
C. DOCTORS’ FEES 
 
Physicians’ charges are another source of major expense for 
retirees and are covered by Medicare Part B.  Medicare pays eighty percent 
of a participating physician’s “approved charge,”51 and the patient then 
owes the remaining twenty percent.  Nonparticipating physicians can 
charge patients up to an additional fifteen percent of the “approved 
charge,”52 and increasing numbers of health care providers are switching 
from participating to nonparticipating provider status53 in response to 
repeated reductions in Medicare’s “approved charge” schedules – the most 
recent being the two percent reduction mandated by the Budget Control 
                                                                                                                                      
49 Id. § 1395x(i)(A). 
50 Exacerbating this problem is the practice of many hospitals to keep patients 
for several days in “observation” status.  See Christopher W. Baugh & Jeremiah D. 
Schur, Observation Care-High-Value Care or a Cost-Shifting Loophole?, 369 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 302, 303 (2013).  Such patients are not treated as being admitted into 
the hospital, so the days they spend in “observation” do not count toward the three-
day minimum.  See id. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(a)(1) (2006). 
52 Id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C). 
53 See Melinda Beck, More Doctors Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J., 
July 29, 2013, at A1, A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 
1424127887323971204578626151017241898 (reporting a 2.9% increase in 
nonparticipating providers from 2010 to 2012). 
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Act’s sequestration provisions.54 In effect, such payment reductions can 
indirectly increase retirees’ health care costs as more physicians change 
their status to nonparticipating provider, a phenomenon that is likely to 
increase as federal budgetary pressures worsen.  
Moreover, it should be emphasized that doctors’ bills are not 
occasional expenditures for most Medicare beneficiaries.  Fully forty 
percent of Medicare’s population has three or more so-called “chronic 
conditions,” such as heart disease, asthma, osteoporosis, hypertension, 
arthritis, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.55 These 
conditions typically require regular appointments with various medical 
specialists to control the patient’s health and to forestall expensive 
complications and hospitalizations.  Doctors’ visits, in other words, are far 
more frequent and less episodic for retirees than for pre-retirees as a 
general matter.  
 
V. MEDICARE PART B OPTIONS 
 
As noted previously in passing, the coverage for physicians’ 
charges just described is provided under Medicare Part B rather than Part 
A, a distinction that has significant financial implications for retirees. 
Medicare Part A is financed by a payroll tax of 1.45 percent imposed on an 
employee’s wages and salaries,56 with a comparable amount paid by that 
person’s employer.57 After that worker (or the worker’s spouse)58 has 
earned forty “quarters of coverage,”59 Medicare Part A is provided without 
any further premiums being charged.60 In contrast, Medicare Part B is a 
                                                                                                                                      
54 2 U.S.C. § 901a(8) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Budget 
Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 302(a), 125 Stat. 240, 258 (2011)). 
55 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 fig. 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-15.pdf. 
56 I.R.C. § 3101(b)(6) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
57 Id. § 3111(b)(6). 
58 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (c)(1) (2006). The 
divorced spouse of a Medicare-eligible worker is also entitled to Medicare Part A 
if the divorced spouse is at least sixty-five years old and if this person was married 
to the Medicare-eligible worker for at least ten years. 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a)(1) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1), (c)(1), 416(d)(1) (2006). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006). 
60 Persons who have not earned the requisite forty “quarters of coverage” may 
purchase Medicare Part A if they have lawfully lived in the United States at least 
five years. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3) (2006). The monthly premium for such 
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separate program that requires annual enrollment and monthly premiums 
paid by the retirees themselves.61 In 2014, this monthly premium is 
$104.90,62 which is calculated to cover approximately twenty-five percent 
of the program’s projected expenditures.63 This monthly outlay, in other 
words, represents a seventy-five percent subsidy from general tax revenues. 
Since 2006, higher-income enrollees have been required to pay 
surcharges to reduce the extent of the subsidy that they receive.64 The 
amount of these so-called “means-tested” surcharges is based on an 
enrollee’s taxable income as determined for the second-preceding calendar 
year.65 Thus, the following table66 displays the monthly cost of Medicare 
Part B in 2014 as a function of a retiree’s income for federal income tax 
purposes in 2011: 
 
Income (if unmarried) Monthly Payment 
$85,000 or less $104.90 
$85,001 - $107,000 $146.90 
$107,001 - $160,000 $209.80 
$160,001 - $214,000 $272.70 
Over $214,000 $335.70 
 
                                                                                                                                      
coverage is adjusted annually and in 2013 was $441. Medicare 2014 Costs at a 
Glance, supra note 35. 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2006). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 
76–83. 
62 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
63 42 U.S.C.§ 1395r(a)(1), (3) (Supp. V 2007–2012); see MEDICARE 
HANDBOOK § 6.02[C][1], at 6–11 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds., 
2013). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(1), (4)(B)(i) (2006). 
65 See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Means-Testing Medicare: Retiree Pain for 
Little Governmental Gain, J. RETIREMENT PLANNING, May-June 2006, at 22.  
66 See Part B Costs, MEDICARE.GOV, http://medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/part -b-costs/part-b-costs.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
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Note that the applicable income thresholds are doubled for married 
couples.67 Moreover, these thresholds were frozen through the year 2019, 
rather than being adjusted for inflation, by the Affordable Care Act.68  
Accordingly, increasing numbers of retirees are likely to face income-based 
surcharges for Medicare Part B in the future.  
The principal point, however, is that Medicare Part B is optional 
coverage.  Thus, retirees must decide as an initial matter whether they want 
such coverage at all. Retirees who do not anticipate having many physician 
encounters might forego such coverage, but they will then be subject to a 
delayed enrollment penalty if they subsequently enroll in this program.69 
This penalty is ten percent of the regular Medicare Part B monthly 
premium for every twelve-month period in which the retiree did not enroll 
in the program when she was first eligible.70  
Assume, for example, that Denise delayed enrolling in Medicare 
Part B for forty months, so there are three twelve-month periods within that 
delayed enrollment period.  She will therefore owe a penalty of thirty 
percent (ten percent for each twelve-month delayed enrollment period) of 
the monthly Medicare Part B premium.  Most importantly, this penalty 
provision never ceases! That is, Denise will owe thirty percent more for her 
Medicare Part B benefits as long as she is enrolled in Medicare Part B. 
 
VI. “MEDIGAP” COVERAGE 
 
As noted previously, the various deductibles and co-payment 
obligations in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B represent an open-
ended liability.  That is, there is no annual cap on the amount of such costs. 
For that reason, many Medicare beneficiaries decide to supplement their 
Medicare coverage with private insurance that is usually called “Medigap” 
insurance.71 Some retirees are able to purchase such supplemental coverage 
from their former employer or from their union, while others obtain such 
                                                                                                                                      
67 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(3)(C)(ii), (iii) (2006). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(6) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 3402(4), 124 Stat. 
119, 489 (2010)). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012). 
70 Id. 
71 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 97–103. 
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coverage individually.72 In any case, the question of supplemental 
insurance presents retirees with further choices, each of which has financial 
implications.  
First, retirees must decide whether to purchase Medigap insurance 
at all. Such policies are not inexpensive and their cost is usually borne by 
the retirees.  The federal government does not provide any financial 
subsidies for Medigap insurance, although it does regulate its content73 and 
mandates that retirees cannot be denied Medigap insurance because of pre-
existing medical conditions if they purchase this insurance within the first 
six months of their enrolling in Medicare Part B.74  
Second, retirees must then select among the eleven different but 
standardized Medigap insurance packages that include various benefits.75  
Medigap insurers can determine what they will charge for particular 
policies, but the scope of any specific “plan” does not vary from one 
insurer to another.  Thus, a retiree must first determine which combination 
of specific benefits most closely fits his or her needs and then look for the 
best price from the insurers that offer that plan.  For example, a prospective 
retiree may choose Medigap coverage for the per-hospital-admission 
deductible under Part A or decide instead to self-insure for that liability by 
not obtaining such coverage.  Similarly, a retiree who expects to travel 
outside the United States might want to add the “foreign travel emergency” 
benefit. In general, the more extensive the coverages included, the higher 
the plan’s cost. But the point is that Medigap itself presents a series of 
distinct choices that a retiree must consider. 
To summarize, a retiree must decide first whether to enroll in 
Medicare Part B presently, whether to enroll at some later time and pay the 
corresponding delayed enrollment penalty, or whether to forego Medicare 
Part B entirely.  This retiree must then decide whether to buy a Medigap 
policy to cover the unlimited cost exposure of Medicare Parts A and B 
presently or to wait until some later time and lose the guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                      
72 See JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE 
CHARTBOOK 60 (4th ed. 2010), available at http://www.collaborationhealthcare. 
com/11-9-10KFFMedicareChartBook2010.pdf (stating that ninety percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries have some supplemental health insurance). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(o), (p), (w), (y) (2006 & Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
74 Id. § 1395ss(s)(2)(A) (2006). 
75 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE & YOU 67–72 (2014), available at 
http://www.medicare. gov/ Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf. 
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insurability that is available within the first six months of Medicare Part B 
enrollment.  Finally, the retiree must decide which specific Medigap policy 
to buy.  
 
VII. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE OPTIONS 
 
The level of complexity and cost exposure described above 
actually pales in comparison to what is involved regarding Medicare’s 
coverage of prescription drugs.  Once again, the threshold decision is 
whether to buy prescription drug coverage at all, or whether to pay for 
prescribed drugs as the need for them arises.  While the private companies 
that provide Medicare Part D coverage cannot deny coverage because of a 
retiree’s pre-existing medical conditions, there is a delayed enrollment 
penalty in Part D that is structured similarly to the delayed enrollment 
penalty in Medicare Part B that was considered previously.76 To some 
extent, the decision to forego Medicare Part D coverage presently is a bet 
that one will not need such coverage any time soon – even though new 
medications are being developed every year to treat existing maladies and 
one never knows whether he or she might be diagnosed with such 
conditions in the future. 
If a retiree does decide to obtain prescription drug coverage under 
Medicare Part D, the next step is determining which plan to buy. This is no 
easy decision, because there is no single Medicare Part D plan or even 
standardized Medicare Part D plans comparable to the federally 
standardized Medigap plans described above.77 Instead, private insurers 
offer different plans in different states that cover some medications and not 
others, and some dosage amounts and frequencies but not others.  Thus, a 
given plan might cover 20 milligrams of Lipitor® twice a day, another plan 
will cover 40 milligrams of that drug once a day, and still another plan will 
not cover Lipitor® at all.  In essence, a retiree must gather the various 
medications that he or she is taking currently and then enter their names, 
dosage amounts, and dosage frequencies into Medicare’s website to find 
the available plans that cover these medications.78 Additional 
                                                                                                                                      
76 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-113(b)(1) (2006). For the mechanics of how this penalty 
is calculated, see FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 88. 
77 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
78 See Medicare Plan Finder, MEDICARE.GOV,  https://www.medicare.gov/ 
find-a-plan/ questions/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). (follow “General 
Search” hyperlink (entering zip code); enter basic information on next page (step 1 
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differentiating variables among the offered plans might include 
convenience of pharmacy locations and availability of mail order renewals. 
Most Medicare Part D plans impose an annual deductible that is 
fairly modest.  In 2013, for example, fifty-five percent of Medicare Part D 
plans had an annual deductible, usually $325.79 Such plans typically 
provide several distinct “tiers” of cost coverage.  That is, a plan might 
require a low or no co-payment for certain generic medications while 
charging a higher co-payment for a preferred brand-name drug and an even 
higher co-payment for a nonpreferred brand-name drug.  Most plans also 
have a coverage gap that is generally denominated the “donut hole” in 
which annual drug expenditures above a specified amount are covered to a 
lesser extent.80 In 2013, two out of three Medicare Part D plans had 
coverage gaps that began at $2,970 in annual drug costs.81 The Affordable 
Care Act purports to close this “donut hole,” but the closing process phases 
in over ten years and will still leave enrollees with a co-payment obligation 
of twenty-five percent when it is complete.82  Thus, retirees in 2014 are 
responsible for seventy-two percent of the cost of generic drugs and forty-
seven and a half percent of the cost of brand-name drugs for costs incurred 
within the “donut hole.”83 
In any case, the procedure for finding a Medicare Part D 
prescription drug plan must be repeated every year, because plan providers 
regularly change their formularies in advance of the annual enrollment 
process.  Thus, a Humana plan that reasonably met a retiree’s needs one 
year may not meet those needs the next year, may be much more 
expensive, or may not even be offered.  I am not making this up! 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
of 4), then see step 2 of 4 “Enter your Drugs” (plan selection and estimate can be 
generated by completing questionnaire)).  
79 JACK HOADLEY ET AL., MEDICARE PART D: A FIRST LOOK AT PART D PLAN 
OFFERINGS IN 2013 3 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word 
press.com/2013/01/8375.pdf. 
80 For an explanation of how this curious provision came about, see Richard L. 
Kaplan, The Medicare Drug Benefit: A Prescription for Confusion, 1 NAELA J. 
167, 170–74 (2005). 
81 See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 3. 
82 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (generic drugs); 
id. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(D)(i)(I), (ii)(VI) (brand-name drugs). For a graphic 
representation of the phase-in process, see Kaplan, supra note 23, at 219–220. 
83 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 75, at 91. 
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VIII. THE MANAGED CARE ALTERNATIVE 
 
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, retirees seeking to 
pay for their health care expenses in retirement confront a bewildering if 
not overwhelming array of disjointed coverages under Medicare, each with 
its own programmatic limitations and cost-sharing provisions.  There is an 
alternative approach, however, in the form of Medicare’s managed care 
component, which is legally designated as Medicare Part C, but is more 
popularly styled Medicare Advantage.84 For a single monthly premium and 
nominal co-payment obligations, one organization provides the sort of all-
inclusive health insurance arrangement that many retirees had when they 
were still working.  Such arrangements typically limit an enrollee’s access 
to specific hospitals, doctors, pharmacies, and other health care providers, 
while services obtained from “out-of network” providers are covered at 
substantially higher cost to the enrollee, or not at all.85 While such 
restrictions are endemic to managed care plans generally, the prospect of 
losing access to favored specialists is often very troubling to retirees who 
have established relationships with particular health care providers.  In fact, 
only twenty-eight percent of Medicare’s population was enrolled in a 
Medicare Advantage plan in 2013.86  
If a retiree is comfortable with the basic concept of managed care, 
that person must then select from among the Medicare Advantage plans 
that are available in that person’s geographic area.  This decision, 
moreover, will probably need to be revisited annually, because Medicare 
Advantage plans regularly change the array of health care providers that 
they include, adding some and dropping others, as well as the scope of 
benefits they provide and the monthly cost they charge to enrollees. This 
process is generally undertaken during the annual “re-enrollment period” 
that runs from October 15 to December 7,87 but certain changes can be 
made at other times as well, such as when an enrollee moves out of the 
geographic area that his or her current Medicare Advantage plan covers.88 
                                                                                                                                      
84 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2006). 
85 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 104–06 (describing 
Medicare’s managed care component). 
86 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET 1 (2013), 
available at http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(e)(3)(B)(v) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
88 Id. § 1395w-21(e)(4)(B) (2006). 
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Near term, such plans may become less available or less appealing 
due to the Affordable Care Act.  The drafters of that legislation believed 
that Medicare managed care plans were overpaid by the federal 
government, so payments to these plans are to be reduced beginning in 
2014.89 In fact, more than a quarter of the cost savings in Medicare from 
ObamaCare come from cuts in payments to Medicare Advantage plans.90 
These plans, therefore, are likely to curtail some of the nonmandatory 
benefits that they provide currently, such as vision care and hearing aids, 
and some plans may terminate their participation in Medicare entirely. 
Little wonder, therefore, that Medicare’s Chief Actuary when the 
Affordable Care Act was being considered predicted that enrollment in 
Medicare Advantage would drop by half when the projected cuts are “fully 
phased in.”91 As even more retirees opt for the disjointed Medicare 
components examined previously instead of Medicare managed care, this 
population will likely face greater health care cost exposure and fiscal 
uncertainty.  
 
IX. THE PREMIUM SUPPORT ALTERNATIVE? 
 
The relatively recent and highly controversial enactment of health 
care reform in 2010 suggests that any serious effort to rethink how health 
care for older Americans should be financed is unlikely any time soon.  In 
fact, ObamaCare is a staggering testament to the power of path 
dependency.  Despite all the heated rhetoric that accompanied its gestation 
and the impassioned allegations of a government “takeover” of the health 
care system, rampant socialism, and even death panels, the Affordable Care 
Act left the basic structure of the Medicare program intact.  The 
noncoordinated components of Medicare Parts A, B, and D, though largely 
accidents of history, were not reformed or rationalized in any meaningful 
                                                                                                                                      
89 See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 239–40. 
90 See Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,” as Amended 2, 8 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/health/oactmemo1.pdf; see also Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office to John Boehner, Speaker 
of the House 5 (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079.pdf (showing that twenty-one percent of the 
projected Medicare savings in the Affordable Care Act derive from cuts to the 
Medicare Advantage program). 
91 Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, supra note 90, at 11. 
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way.  In fact, the only paradigmatic alternative to this basic structure – 
namely, Medicare managed care – was actually the focus of significant 
budget cuts. 
In 2011, the chair of the House Budget Committee, Congressman 
Paul Ryan, proposed transforming the Medicare program into a 
marketplace where beneficiaries could select from various comprehensive 
offerings, with the federal government providing premium support or 
“vouchers” for these offerings.92 Instead of the present one-size-fits-all 
approach, the retirement health care universe would look more like what 
Americans under age sixty-five typically have. Congressman Ryan’s plan 
included very few details, but the basic vision it propounded would look 
fairly familiar to persons who have never enrolled in Medicare. Be that as it 
may, the 2012 elections effectively sidelined that effort for the foreseeable 
future, and President Obama’s full-throated defense of entitlement 
programs such as Medicare in his Second Inaugural Address93 makes major 
systemic change unlikely.  
From the perspective of current and near-retirees, however, the 
Ryan proposal would have been irrelevant by its very terms.  His original 
proposal would have applied only to persons who first became eligible for 
Medicare in the year 2022.94 That provision essentially exempts the current 
Medicare population, as well as a significant portion of the vaunted Baby 
Boom generation that is gaining access to Medicare with each passing day. 
Even more to the point, Ryan subsequently adopted a feature suggested by 
Senator Ron Wyden that would retain the existing Medicare program as 
one of the alternatives in the marketplace that he intends to create.95 In 
                                                                                                                                      
92 See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY 
RESTORING AMERICA’S PROMISE 46–47 (Comm. Print 2011), available at 
http://budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ PathToProsperityFY2012.pdf (primarily 
the work of Chairman Paul Ryan). 
93 See Barack H. Obama, Full Text of President Barack Obama’s Second 
Presidential Inaugural Address, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 2 (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/21/full-text-of-president-barack-
obamas-second-inaugural-address_print.html (“The commitments we make to each 
other: through Medicare, and Medicaid, and Social Security, these things do not 
sap our initiative; they strengthen us. They do not make us a nation of takers; they 
free us to take the risks that make this country great.”). 
94 H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 92, at 46. 
95 See SEN. RON WYDEN & REP. PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES TO 
STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH SECURITY FOR ALL 7 (2011), available at 
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/wydenryan.pdf. Senator Wyden 
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other words, the latest iteration of Ryan’s proposal would actually keep the 
existing discombobulated Medicare program in place as long as any 
Medicare-eligible retiree, now or in the future, selects it. 
 
X. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREES 
 
As retirees contemplate the accumulated balances in their defined 
contribution retirement plans, they must consider how much of those 
balances they will need to spend on health care in retirement, which is 
likely to be one of their largest budget items.  Current cost projections are 
undoubtedly understated if past trends are indicative.  The history of 
medical, and especially pharmacological, progress makes conditions that 
were previously untreatable newly treatable if not curable.  Newly 
concocted drug regimens may be much less expensive than hospitalizations 
and their medically intensive therapies, but such drug regimens are not 
cheap either.  Even though the cost of pharmaceutical interventions is 
shared by retirees and the Medicare program, a significant portion of those 
costs is paid by the retirees themselves, so increasing drug costs represent a 
rising cost burden to retirees generally. 
By contrast, most of the money saved by fewer hospitalizations 
would have been paid by the Medicare program itself.  After the per-
admission deductible is paid, most other hospital costs are paid by 
Medicare, as noted previously.  And if future medical innovations translate 
into more nursing home stays instead of hospitalizations, the resulting 
nursing home care may not be the “skilled nursing care” that Medicare 
pays for.96 Even if it is, Medicare’s liability for such costs is limited to one 
hundred days, so any additional days in the nursing home is an expense of 
the retiree rather than of Medicare.  As a consequence, Medicare’s hospital 
expenditures may decrease, but retirees’ outlays for nursing home care will 
likely increase.  That phenomenon explains, in part, this graph from the 
New England Journal of Medicine,97 which shows that the cumulative cost 
of a person’s health care expenditures (solid line) increases the longer that 
                                                                                                                                      
subsequently distanced himself from this proposal. Sen. Wyden Distances Himself 
from Medicare Plan He Crafted with Ryan, THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2012, 04:43PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/politics-elections/243387-wyden-downplays-
medicare-plan-he-crafted-with-ryan. 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 45–47. 
97 Brenda C. Spillman & James Lubitz, The Effect of Longevity on Spending 
for Acute and Long-Term Care, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1409, 1411 (2000). 
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person lives, but the cumulative cost paid by Medicare (long dash/short 
dash line) does not.  
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Health Care Expenditures from the Age of 65 Years 
until Death, According to the Type of Health Service and the Age of Death: 
 
  
 
In other words, extended longevity may increase per capita medical 
expenditures, but much of that increase will not burden the Medicare 
program.  To put the matter bluntly, the additional medical costs associated 
with increased longevity will largely be on the retiree’s dime. 
 
XI. FUNDING LONG-TERM CARE 
 
Retirees’ responsibility for their own long-term care costs is a 
major and largely unrecognized variable in assessing retirement funding 
adequacy.  This is a huge point, as I explained in my article entitled 
“Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care.”98 Not 
                                                                                                                                      
98 See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: 
Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407 (2007) (examining the 
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only is Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing homes severely limited,99 its 
coverage of home health care is limited to no more than twenty-eight hours 
per week100 of specified types of care101 that are provided by Medicare-
certified home health agencies102 pursuant to a physician’s plan of care.103 
Moreover, only someone who cannot leave his or her home without 
assistance is eligible for this care.104 A joint federal and state government 
program called Medicaid105 does cover many forms of long-term care, but 
Medicaid has severe assets and income qualification standards106 and as a 
result, few retirees plan to avail themselves of its provisions.  Moreover, 
budgetary pressures on state governments result in ever-tightening 
eligibility standards, making Medicaid an increasingly unreliable source for 
funding future long-term care needs.107  From the perspective of retirement 
security, in other words, the cost of long-term care is essentially a private 
expense. 
And a considerable expense it can be. According to the most recent 
survey of long-term care costs in the United States,108 the median costs of 
long-term care are as follows:   
 
• licensed home health aide – $19 per hour 
• adult day care – $65 per day 
• assisted living facility – $3,450 per month, and  
• nursing home (private room) – $230 per day.  
                                                                                                                                      
major missing component of retirement planning: how to finance the potentially 
explosive cost of long-term care). 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 41–50. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (2006). 
101 Id. § 1395x(m)(1), (2). 
102 Id. § 1395x(m), (o). 
103 Id. § 1395x(m). 
104 Id. §§ 1395f(a)(2)(C), 1395n(a)(2). 
105 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 110–38. 
106 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 423–25. In addition, the value of the benefits 
received from Medicaid must be recovered when the Medicaid recipient dies. See 
id. at 429–30. 
107 See, e.g., Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, 2012 Ill. 
Legis. Serv. 120 (enacting tightened restrictions on eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits). 
108 GENWORTH, GENWORTH 2013 COST OF CARE SURVEY 4 (10th ed. 2013), 
available at https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer 
/corporate/130568_032213_Cost%20of%20Care_Final_nonsecure.pdf. 
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This last amount translates into an annual cost of $83,950.  These figures, 
moreover, represent national medians, and the cost differentials among 
states and within states are considerable.109 
 
A. LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 
 
Private long-term care insurance has been developed to respond to 
this need, but its problems are legion.  The cost of such insurance is high 
and premiums of current policyholders are regularly increased by fifty 
percent or more a year.110 Policy options are unstandardized and 
confusing,111 and insurer solvency is a major concern112 – especially as 
more long-term care insurance companies exit this marketplace.113 
Moreover, nearly a quarter of sixty-five-year-olds are medically ineligible 
to buy such insurance,114 even if they were willing to bear the associated 
expense. 
Just the briefest overview of what is involved in acquiring long-
term care insurance can be discerned from the following table115 of policy 
choices and premiums offered by one prominent insurer:  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
109 See id. at 14–72 (compilations by cities and states for each care category). 
110 See Do You Need Long-Term-Care Insurance?, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 
2003, at 20, 22; see also Jennifer Levitz & Kelly Greene, States Draw Fire for 
Pitching Citizens on Private Long-Term Care Insurance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 
2008, at A1 (reporting a 260% increase in premiums in only three years); Kelly 
Greene & Leslie Scism, Long-Term-Care Insurance Leaves Customers Groping, 
WALL ST. J., July 2, 2013, at A1 (reporting a 77% increase in one year); see 
generally Kaplan, supra note 98, at 440–41. 
111 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 438–39. 
112 See id. at 441-42; M.P. McQueen, Insurer Casts Off Long-Term-Care 
Policies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2008, at D1. 
113 See Kelly Greene, Long-Term Care: What Now?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 
2012 (noting that ten of the top twenty long-term care insurers by sales volume 
have left this market within the past five years). 
114 See Christopher M. Murtaugh et al., Risky Business: Long-Term Care 
Insurance Underwriting, 32 INQUIRY 271, 277 (1995). 
115 See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Your Needs, Plus Your Budget, Equals What to 
Pay on Long-Term Care Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1997, at C1 (rates for John 
Hancock Life Insurance Co.). 
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ANNUAL COST OF AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY 
Age at Issue 55 65 75 
$100 daily benefit for nursing-home;  
home-health coverage; 4 years coverage;  
100-day deductible period 
 $510  $990 $2,830 
Shorter coverage period: 2 years   380 720 2,010 
Lower home-health-care benefit: $50 
daily 
410 810 2,350 
Shorter deductible period: 20 days 643 1,247 3,566 
Richer benefits: $200 daily for nursing 
home and home-health care 
1,020 1,980 5,660 
Inflation-indexed benefits: annual 
increases at 5% compounded rate 
1,090 l,740 4,230 
 
The premiums quoted above are over a decade old, and premiums 
are undoubtedly higher today, but the long-term care insurance industry 
does not generally make price information available outside of a 
personalized – read, pressurized – presentation by a sales agent.116 Even so, 
this table can convey some of the complex choices that a prospective buyer 
of long-term care insurance must confront: 
 
• Whether to buy a long-term care insurance policy at all, or 
plan instead to fund long-term care needs as they arise by 
accessing the equity in one’s residence via a “reverse 
mortgage.”117  
• If an insurance policy is desired, how much should the 
daily benefit be? 
• How long should these benefits last? 
                                                                                                                                      
116 But see Long-Term Care Sample Rates, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/survey/survey?type=longTermCareSurvey
&event=longTermCareSearch (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (making rates available 
online for certain specified insurance packages in California); Long-Term Care 
Insurance Rate Gide Sample Policy 1, TEX. DEP’T OF INS., 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/lrg policy1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2014) (making rates available in Texas). 
117 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 212–22. Another 
possible funding source might be “accelerated benefits” on an existing life 
insurance policy that can be accessed for long-term care. See id. at 156–58. 
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• How long should the deductible or “elimination period” 
be? 
• Should home health care be covered and if so, at what 
daily rate? 
• Should the daily benefit be increased for inflation and if so, 
what metric (consumer price index, five percent simple, 
five percent compounded) should apply? 
 
There are other policy decisions as well that are not captured by the 
preceding chart, such as whether to have premiums waived when benefits 
begin, whether to have the premiums refunded if no benefits are ever paid, 
and so forth.118 But the main point is that securing insurance to cover 
possible long-term care expenses is not a simple or straightforward process. 
 
B. GOVERNMENTAL COVERAGE OF LONG-TERM CARE COSTS 
 
In this context, it is notable that the Affordable Care Act included a 
voluntary long-term care insurance program called Community Living 
Assistance Services and Supports, or CLASS.119 This program would have 
covered some – but not all – long-term care costs in various settings, but its 
benefits were targeted to less costly care environments, such as home 
health care and community-based services, rather than assisted living 
facilities and nursing homes.120 In any case, the enabling legislation 
mandated that the CLASS program be fiscally self-sustaining,121 a 
requirement that the Obama Administration’s Department of Health and 
Human Services determined was impossible to satisfy.  In October 2011, 
the Secretary of that Department declared that the CLASS program would 
not be implemented,122 and these now-moribund provisions were then 
                                                                                                                                      
118 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 439. 
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll–300ll-9 (Supp. IV 2007–2011) (enacted as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 8002, 124 
Stat. 119, 828–47 (2010)). 
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll-1, 300ll-2, 300ll-4 (Supp. IV 2007–2011); see generally 
Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care After Health Care Reform, J. 
RETIREMENT PLAN., July–Aug. 2010, at 7. 
121 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-7(a), (b) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
122 See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
to Congress (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/blog/ 2011/10/class10142011.html. 
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repealed by the legislation that forestalled the “fiscal cliff” at the very 
beginning of 2013.123 In its place, Congress created that most 
quintessentially worthless alternative, a commission to study how long-
term care should be financed.124 The bottom line is that the federal 
government will probably not be increasing its role in financing long-term 
care outside the poverty-based space that is presently occupied by 
Medicaid any time soon. 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Retirees are never more “on their own” than when they try to cover 
their retirement health care expenses.  In fact, a comprehensive analysis of 
twelve prominent online retirement calculators found that all but two did 
not even consider health and long-term care expenses.125 Yet, seniors who 
consulted a professional regarding retirement planning indicated that their 
number one concern was “the future of Medicare,” followed closely by 
“paying for long-term care” and “paying for healthcare.”126 With health 
care constituting one of the largest and the least predictable of all 
retirement expenses,127 retirees with defined contribution plans will be 
increasingly desperate as they contemplate the daunting challenge of 
covering these critical costs.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
123 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 642(a), 
126 Stat. 2313, 2358. 
124 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 643, 126 
Stat. 2313, 2358–62. 
125 BRYAN DOWD ET AL., AARP PUB. POL. INST., PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT? 
WEB CALCULATORS WEAK ON HEALTH COSTS 7–8 (2008), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/ 2008_12_savings.pdf.  
126 ALLSUP, ALLSUP MEDICARE ADVISOR® SENIORS SURVEY: MEDICARE 
PLANNING AND TRENDS AMONG SENIORS WITH FINANCIAL PLANNERS 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.allsup.com/portals/4/AMA-Seniors-Survey-Financial Plan 
ners-Oct2012.pdf. 
127 See Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket 
Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 62, 83–85 (2013) (comparing estimates of future health care 
spending of 1,700 near and current retirees with experts’ estimates). 
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In the United States, the availability of tax subsidies for retirement savings 
is largely based on an individual’s employment status and whether such 
individual’s employer has voluntarily chosen to offer a tax-favored savings 
vehicle.  Even where an individual has access to an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, such plans are too often suboptimally designed.  This 
article proposes an incremental reform that ensures universal access to 
tax-favored retirement savings irrespective of employment status or 
employer decisions.  Borrowing from the model of the Affordable Care Act, 
the article calls for the creation of an optional, universally available 
retirement plan, which would be designed according to both retirement 
savings and behavioral best practices.  Such a plan would be designed to 
increase the number of Americans saving for retirement, as well as the 
likelihood that individuals will accumulate sufficient savings to maintain 
their standard of living throughout retirement.  After discussing the design 
details for such a plan, the article concludes by examining the legal and 
practical challenges of implementing a universal retirement plan at either 
the federal or state level. 
 
*** 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Given the current challenges of implementing the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), it is perhaps unwise to suggest that the ACA’s model should be 
replicated in the retirement plan context, as the title of this article suggests.   
However, the basic structure of the ACA, which provides all Americans 
with access to health insurance regardless of their employment status or 
their employer’s choices, provides a promising model for enhancing 
retirement savings and security. 
 Many Americans are ill equipped for their retirement, having failed 
to save a sufficient amount to maintain their standard of living in 
                                                                                                                 
*Julius E. Davis Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful 
to Pat McCoy and the many participants in “The Challenge of Retirement in a 
Defined Contribution World” symposium at the University of Connecticut School 
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retirement.1 Much blame for this failure has been placed on the widespread 
shift in the design of employer-sponsored retirement plans.2 Instead of 
being offered traditional, defined benefit pension plans that offer a set level 
of lifetime income, most employees are now offered only a defined 
contribution plan, usually in the form of a 401(k) plan.3 These defined 
contribution plans depend for their success on individual participants 
making rational decisions and executing them in a timely manner.  Yet, 
there is significant evidence suggesting that many individuals fail to make 
rational decisions and implement them in a timely manner.  As one 
prominent scholar succinctly put it, “It’s crazy that we ended up with this 
as our retirement system.”4 The popular 401(k) plans, she explained, were 
meant to supplement traditional forms of lifetime income, such as social 
security and defined benefit pension plans.5 “It was supposed to be money 
that you could use to go to Paris.  Instead, it’s become our basic system.”6  
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The EBRI Retirement 
Readiness Rating: Retirement Income Preparation and Future Prospects, 334 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645412 (estimating that 47.2% of early baby 
boomers are at risk of not having sufficient resources to pay for basic retirement 
expenditures and uninsured health costs). One large administrator of 401(k) plans 
recently reported that average 401(k) plan balances for those age 65-69 were 
$136,800. Jill Schlesinger, The Latest on America’s 401(k)s, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 
2013, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-27/business/sns-
201302271600--tms--retiresmctnrs-a20130227-20130227_1_retirement-savings-
fidelity-plans-fidelity-investments. 
2 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 
YALE L.J. 451 (2004); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time 
to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 305 (2007). 
3 Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010, 
34 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr-13_CDHPs-RetPart1.pdf (finding that among 
working heads of households who participated in an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, 18.9% participated only in a defined benefit plan, 65% 
participated only in a defined contribution plan, and 16.1% participated in both). 
4 Jeff Sommer, Suddenly, Many Nest Eggs Look Fragile, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/your-money/suddenly-retiree-nest-eggs 
-look-more-fragile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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 While the problems associated with individual retirement savings 
decisions are well documented, this article seeks to highlight another 
weakness of our current reliance on 401(k) plans to deliver retirement 
security – suboptimal employer decision-making.  Our retirement savings 
system relies on employers voluntarily offering retirement plans.  Some 
employees do not have access to tax-favored retirement savings plans 
simply because their employer does not offer one.  And even when 
employers do offer a plan, they often offer a plan that is not well-designed 
to help participants accumulate sufficient retirement savings.  These plans 
often minimize employer costs while failing to take into account the 
abundant literature on 401(k) plan designs that can help overcome some of 
the well-known weaknesses in individual retirement savings decisions.  To 
address the potential problems with employer decision-making in the 
401(k) plan context, this article suggests both federal and state solutions 
that borrow from the ACA model for health insurance to ensure that all 
Americans who wish to save for retirement have a well-designed option 
available to them in the event their employer either fails to offer a plan or 
offers a plan that is suboptimally designed.  The goal of this proposal is to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding retirement 
saving and also suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 
II.      WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT MODEL OF RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS 
  
The weaknesses in individual decision-making within participant-
directed 401(k) plans are well documented.  Individuals struggle to begin 
saving at an early enough age to meet their retirement goals, they often fail 
to contribute sufficient amounts, and have difficulty navigating investment 
and distribution options.  Less appreciated is the fact that many employers 
make poor decisions when they design their 401(k) plans.  This Part will 
review the weaknesses in the 401(k) plan model that might explain why so 
few Americans appear to be able to achieve financial security through such 
plans. 
 
 A.  INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
 Section 401(k) plans are premised on classic economic theory, 
which posits that welfare will be optimized where each individual makes 
his or her own rational savings and consumption decisions within a fully 
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functioning market.7 The success of a 401(k) plan in providing adequate 
retirement income depends on an individual making several important 
decisions: whether and when to participate in the plan, what amount of 
salary to defer to the plan, where to invest plan contributions, when (if at 
all) to access retirement savings prior to retirement, and the rate at which to 
withdraw savings once retirement age has been reached.  If an individual is 
perfectly rational, this type of retirement plan should work very well, as it 
can be customized to match the individual’s preferences.8 
 We have good reason to believe, however, that most individuals 
are not perfectly rational and do not make optimal decisions within the 
401(k) plan context.9 These problems with participant-level decision-
making have been well documented elsewhere,10 and therefore this article 
provides only a high-level overview of the key findings.  For plans that 
require an individual to take affirmative action to enroll in the plan, 
participants often procrastinate in implementing the decision to participate, 
thereby shortening the period of time they are saving for retirement.11 In 
addition, many studies have shown that once individuals elect to participate 
they are overwhelmed by the decisions they are required to make, such as 
selecting a contribution level and making investment decisions, and 
therefore stick to the defaults or allow the plan’s framing of choices to 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and 
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 480–81 (2004). 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (David 
A. Wise ed., 2004); Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and 
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and 
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. 
Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 81 (2007); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
1149 (2001); Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance for Retirement Plan Design (Pension Research Council, Working Paper 
No. 2003-6, 2003). For a helpful overview of the literature on retirement savings 
decisions, see Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and 
Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. 
SEC. BULL. 1 (2010).  
10 See sources cited supra note 9. 
11 Knoll, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
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impact their decisions.12 There is also strong evidence that hyperbolic 
discounting affects retirement savings decisions causing individuals to give 
more weight to current consumption than to future needs, thereby under-
saving for retirement.13 Many studies have shown that simply changing 
plan defaults results in dramatic changes in behavior – which would not be 
predicted under standard economic theory.14 According to standard 
economic theory, a rational decision-maker will simply opt out of any 
defaults that do not maximize her preferences.15 Yet, the evidence on the 
impact of defaults in the retirement savings context suggests that cognitive 
biases are impacting many individuals’ decision-making.16 
 
 B.   EMPLOYER DECISION-MAKING 
 
 A less explored weakness inherent in relying on 401(k) plans to 
provide retirement security is the fact that they depend on sound employer 
decision-making.17  In theory, employers should act as effective agents for 
their employees and offer retirement plans that maximize their employees’ 
preferences.18  But there are various reasons why employers may not, in 
fact, offer plans designed to produce adequate retirement income.  The 
subparts below illustrate the ways in which employer decision-making can 
negatively impact employees’ retirement security. 
 
 1.  Failing to Offer a Plan 
 
 Employers are not required to offer any type of retirement plan to 
their workers.  It is a completely voluntary decision, driven by labor market 
                                                                                                                 
12 See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 9, at 66; Choi et al., supra note 9, 
at 125. 
13 See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
14 See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 9. 
15 See id. at 81. 
16 See id. See also Madrian & Shea, supra note 9. 
17 For an examination of the role of employers in employees’ health and 
retirement security, see Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 751 (2014). 
18 See Gregory Acs & Eugene Steuerle, The Corporation as Dispenser of 
Welfare and Security, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY: EXAMINING THE 
QUESTIONS OF POWER AND EFFICIENCY AT THE CENTURY'S END 360, 361 (Carl 
Kaysen, ed. 1996). 
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pressures.19 We would expect an employer to voluntarily offer a retirement 
plan in lieu of other forms of compensation where it believes that doing so 
will help it attract and retain workers.20 Indeed, pension formation is 
typically explained as a contract driven by worker demand to provide 
workers with security and income protection.21 But it is widely 
acknowledged that pensions also offer other benefits to employers, in 
addition to simply helping them attract and retain employees.  For example, 
pensions can help employers control their employees’ tenure and turnover 
by designing plans to encourage retirement at certain ages.22   
 But allowing labor market pressures to determine whether a 
retirement plan is offered has shortcomings.  It aggregates the preferences 
of employees.  If the majority of employees of a given employer do not 
value retirement benefits, the employer is unlikely to offer a plan.  For 
those minority employees that would value a retirement plan, their only 
option would be to find a different employer that offers the desired 
benefits.  Because many factors enter into a decision to work at one firm 
over another, it may be that many who desire a retirement plan are not 
offered one.  And bear in mind that a job switch is in fact the only complete 
solution if an employee’s current employer fails to offer a retirement plan.  
While there are individual tax-favored retirement accounts available 
outside of the employment context, none can duplicate the extent of the tax 
benefits available to employer plans.  An employee can currently defer up 
to $17,500 of her salary tax-free per year to a 401(k) plan,23 but can only 
contribute $5,500 annually to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).24 
 Prior to health care reform, we saw the same dynamic at play in an 
employer’s decision to offer a health plan to employees.  Employers 
                                                                                                                 
19 See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 2 (1992). 
20 See Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A 
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 417, 426 (1994). 
21 GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19. For alternative explanations of pension 
formation, see id. at 2–7. 
22 Id. at 2–3. 
23 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-
to-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014. Participants who are age fifty or older 
are permitted to contribute an addition $5,500 each year, for a total of $23,000 per 
year.  Id. 
24 Id. Participants who are age fifty or older may contribute an additional 
$1,000 per year to an IRA, for a total annual contribution of $6,500. Id. 
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decided to offer a health plan based on labor market pressures,25 and 
employees had little ability to replicate the benefits of an employer plan by 
seeking individual level coverage.26 Health care reform will change this 
reliance on employers, as discussed in more detail in Part II. 
 
 2.  Offering a Suboptimal Plan 
 
 Even if an employer offers a retirement plan, it may nevertheless 
be the case that an employer offers a plan that, from an employee’s 
perspective, is suboptimally designed.  Employers offer retirement plans in 
order to recruit and retain valued workers.  Retirement plans help recruit 
and retain workers when workers find them to be a positive addition to 
their compensation package.  Employers should therefore structure their 
retirement plans in a way that employees find attractive.27 In other words, 
we would expect employers to be effective agents for their employees 
when they design their retirement plans.28 Employees, however, are 
unlikely to be familiar with all of the features of their retirement plan, and 
are likely, when evaluating an employer plan, to focus on only a few 
features that are highly salient to employees.29 For example, it seems 
plausible that employees would focus on whether a plan is offered at all, 
and the amount and structure of any employer contributions to the plan, 
such as matching or profit sharing contributions.  Most employees, when 
deciding whether to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm, 
probably do not examine plan details such as plan defaults, the quality of 
plan investments, investment fees, or forms of distribution.  If employers 
believe or discover that employees focus only on a handful of highly salient 
features, employers are likely to respond by structuring their plans only 
around those features and otherwise acting to minimize their costs.  For 
example, an employer might offer a 401(k) plan with a matching 
                                                                                                                 
25 See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Quality and Employers' Choice 
of Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 471, 472 (2004). 
26 See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1944 (2013). 
27 For an overview of pension theories, see GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19, at 1–
7. 
28 See Chernew et al., supra note 24, at 472. 
29 See James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 
J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 199 (1998) (discussing that increased numbers of 
alternatives facing the consumer when choosing retirement products lead to a 
greater use of non-compensatory strategies which eliminate alternatives). 
466      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
contribution that equals or exceeds that offered by its competitor firms, but 
in order to reduce its costs associated with the plan might select a plan 
provider that offers high fee investments, defaults that do not address 
participants’ likely cognitive biases, and distribution forms that do not help 
participants manage income in retirement.  The end result may be that even 
where employers offer plans, they offer plans that are not designed to 
maximize participants’ retirement security. 
 Again, much the same dynamic is at play in how employers 
approach health plan design.  Employees are likely to focus only on highly 
salient features when evaluating a health plan – in this case on premium 
levels, copays, and whether their current doctor is in-network.30 And 
employers are likely to respond to this employee focus by designing plans 
around the highly salient features, potentially at the expense of other 
important plan design features such as the quality of the plan or providers.31 
 If this hypothesis regarding employer plan design is correct, the 
implications for retirement and health security are significant.  In the 
retirement plan context, it would mean that even if every employer made a 
401(k) plan available to its workers, the problem of insufficient retirement 
savings would not be solved.  While we know relatively little regarding 
how employer plan design decisions are made and the factors that motivate 
those design decisions, data regarding plan features provide support for the 
hypothesis that the majority of employers do not offer plans that are 
optimally designed.  Plans often have defaults that work against retirement 
savings.  Individuals that desire to participate must take active steps to 
enroll in the plan, instead of being defaulted into participation.32 Even 
where participants are automatically enrolled in a plan, default contribution 
                                                                                                                 
30 See Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 
TAX L. REV. 749, 764–765 (2012). 
31 See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient 
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market 
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1999) (explaining how health insurance 
companies are likely to structure health plans given consumers’ focus on only a 
handful of highly salient features). 
32 See Alicia H. Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010: An Update from the SCF, 
ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. C., Boston, MA), July 2012, at 1, 4, 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IB_12-13-508.pdf 
(finding that fewer than half of all 401(k) plans offered automatic enrollment in 
2010). 
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rates are often too low to provide adequate savings.33 Many plans allow 
easy access to savings prior to retirement,34 and nearly all have a lump sum 
distribution as either the default or the only form of distribution available.35  
 In addition, plans sometimes work against participants’ savings 
goals by offering poor investment choices and little investment advice.36  
As we have seen through countless class action lawsuits, many employers 
allegedly offer a menu of investments that charge excessive fees.37 
                                                                                                                 
33 See id. See also DELOITTE, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 9 
(2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Consulting/us_cons_hc_401ksbecnchm
arkingsurvey2012.pdf (finding that the average default contribution rate was 3%, 
an amount unlikely “to support a comfortable retirement”). 
34 For example, approximately 90% of 401(k) plan participants participate in a 
plan that offers plan loans. John Beshears et al., The Availability and Utilization of 
401(k) Loans 2 (John. F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 11-023, 
2011), available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id 
=693. Sixty-six percent of all 401(k) plans permit participants to take hardship 
distributions prior to retirement. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K) 
COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE FINAL REPORT 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/401k_final_report.pdf. Studies are, however, 
mixed on the extent to which such pre-retirement access threatens retirement 
security. See generally sources cited infra note 64. 
35 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 34, at 59 (finding that 99% of 
401(k) plans offer a lump sum distribution, while only 19% offer a qualified joint 
and survivor annuity). See also HEWITT ASSOC., TRENDS AND EXPERIENCES IN 
401(K) PLANS 7 (2009) available at http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/ 
Library/Hewitt_Research_Trends_in_401k_Highlights.pdf (finding that all 401(k) 
plans offered a lump sum option, while 14% offered annuities). 
36 See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for 
Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511–12 (2013) (examining the weaknesses of 
401(k) investment options); Karen Blumenthal, Thanks but No Thanks on 401(k) 
Advice, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204346104576638933476020932 (finding that while a 
majority of 401(k) plans offer investment advice, only around a quarter of 
participants offered some form of investment advice utilize the service).  
37 For a detailed examination of this litigation and its effects, see Mercer 
Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical 
Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 335 
(2014) and Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive 
Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans 13-20 (Feb. 
21, 2014 (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. See also Kelly 
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Employers often offer employer stock as an investment option, even though 
in many cases it is unwise for a participant who depends on an employer 
for her current income to invest in that employer’s stock for her long-term 
savings.38 And finally, plans are permitted to, and often do, pass along to 
participants nearly all of the administrative costs of running the plan, 
further reducing participants’ rate of return.39 
 There has been one area of plan design that has improved 
significantly over the last decade.  Beginning in the 1990s, several 401(k) 
plan sponsors began experimenting with automatic enrollment provisions, 
which provide that an eligible participant will automatically participate in 
the employer’s plan unless he or she takes affirmative action to opt out.40 
The number of employers utilizing automatic enrollment grew following 
the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which offered 
employers various incentives for putting such procedures in place.  
However, a well-known potential weakness of automatic enrollment 
provisions is that plan sponsors can choose default contribution levels and 
investment options that are too low and too conservative to produce 
adequate retirement savings.  When automatic enrollment provisions first 
gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, default investment 
options were primarily conservative, capital-preserving investments.41 
However, a recent survey found that 82% of plans with automatic 
enrollment now had as their default investment option a lifecycle or target-
date fund, designed to invest appropriately given the participant’s years to 
                                                                                                                 
Greene, Letters About 401(k) Plan Costs Stir Tempest, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578626103409
341648 (describing Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres’ letter writing campaign to 
401(k) plan sponsors regarding their fee levels, and the reaction such letters have 
provoked).  
38 See generally Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant 
Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010). 
39 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 19 (finding that 51% of plans paid all 
administrative and recordkeeping fees through investment revenue). 
40 See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement 
Savings for 401(k) Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4 
(2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf. 
41 See PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC 
ENROLLMENT 2001: A STUDY OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT PRACTICES IN 401(K) 
PLANS available at http://www.pcsa.org/data/autoenroll2001.asp (finding that 
among plans with automatic enrollment, 66% had a conservative default 
investment option such as a stable value or money market fund). 
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retirement.42 Note, however, that this change was likely brought about by a 
change in Department of Labor regulations that protected plan fiduciaries 
from liability where they offered a “qualified investment” as the default 
investment option.43 This change does not appear to have been the result of 
employers independently making a decision to improve the quality of the 
plan’s default investment option.  As a result, this improvement does not 
provide significant evidence against the hypothesis that employers often 
lack motivation to design optimal retirement plans.  Indeed, when the state 
of 401(k) plan design is viewed as a whole, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that even when participants are lucky enough to be offered an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, that plan in many cases will not be designed to 
maximize retirement security. 
 
III.   THE ACA MODEL 
 
 While there is reason to be less than confident in our current 
retirement savings system, the structure of federal health care reform 
provides an interesting model of how dependence on employers can be 
reduced, and portions of its structure might successfully be borrowed to 
improve retirement savings.  As noted above, there are important 
similarities between employer-sponsored health and retirement plans.  Both 
types of plans depend on employer decision-making for their success.  An 
employer must decide to offer a plan if an employee is to have access to the 
benefit at all, since neither type of plan can be duplicated outside of the 
employment context.44 And the quality of the benefit provided depends in 
large part on how employers decide to structure the benefit plan.  If an 
employer makes suboptimal choices in a health plan, an individual’s health 
                                                                                                                 
42 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 11. 
43 Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). Each of the three qualified default 
investment options is diversified in order to minimize the risk of large losses but 
also to provide long-term growth potential. 
44 Health plans, like retirement plans, depend on employer sponsorship for the 
individual to receive the most favorable tax treatment. If an employee buys health 
insurance on her own, she must pay for the coverage with after-tax dollars, 
whereas an employee who participates in an employer plan may pay premiums 
with pre-tax dollars. This tax advantage did not change with the passage of the 
ACA. In addition, purchasing coverage through an employer gives the employee 
access to group coverage, which tends to be more affordable than individual 
coverage.  See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 1942–44. 
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security can be jeopardized, much the same way an individual’s retirement 
security can be compromised if an employer designs a suboptimal 
retirement plan. 
 For health plans, however, this should begin to change as the major 
reforms of the ACA take effect.45 Once the ACA’s provisions are fully 
effective, individuals who are not offered health coverage through an 
employer, or are offered a plan that does not satisfy their preferences, 
should have a meaningful coverage alternative.  Such individuals can freely 
purchase any individual coverage available on their state’s health insurance 
exchange46 and, assuming these markets function well post-reform, should 
have a broad variety of plan designs and premium levels from which to 
choose.47 The ACA requires all plans sold on the state exchanges (referred 
to as “qualified health plans”) to satisfy various plan design, content and 
quality requirements in order to ensure that the options available meet 
minimum standards.48 In other words, one underappreciated function of the 
ACA is to act as a backstop for employer choices that might be suboptimal 
from an employee’s perspective.  While not perfect (an employee 
purchasing health insurance on an exchange would have to purchase 
coverage with after-tax instead of pre-tax dollars), the ACA should give an 
individual a much greater ability to secure desired health care coverage 
without regard to his or her employer’s choices.49 For example, if an 
employee is offered health insurance coverage by her employer that has a 
deductible too high for the employee to afford, or that fails to offer a broad 
network of providers, that employee is no longer effectively stuck with 
what the employer offers, but will instead have the option of going to her 
state’s health insurance exchange and buying coverage that satisfies her 
preferences. 
 The ACA’s provision of a universal option available to all 
individuals without regard to employment status or employer decision-
making provides an interesting model that might be of use in improving 
retirement security in the United States.  Part IV below explores ways in 
                                                                                                                 
45 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
46 See 42 U.S.C. 18031(b) (Supp. V 2012). 
47 See 42 U.S.C. 18022 (Supp. V 2012). 
48 See id. 
49 For a discussion of some of the implications of these choices, see Brendan 
S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the 
Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099 (2012). 
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which both the federal and state governments could borrow from the ACA 
to provide a meaningful alternative to suboptimal employer-sponsored 
retirement plans. 
 
IV.   A UNIVERSAL BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
 Both the federal and state governments have the ability to use law 
to improve retirement security for many Americans.  This Part begins by 
exploring the use of a universal “backstop” retirement plan, similar to the 
concept of a qualified health plan under the ACA, which could help to 
address the problem of flawed employer decision-making.  It then discusses 
the possibilities and impediments associated with establishing such a 
backstop at either the federal or state level. 
 
 A.  BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN 
 
 There are myriad problems in our current retirement savings 
system.  Employer plans provide the greatest tax benefit for retirement 
savings, but are far from universal.50 Even when employer plans are 
available, they are often not designed to address the well-documented 
mistakes that individuals make in their retirement savings decisions.51 
While there are Individual Retirement Accounts universally available, these 
savings vehicles have much lower contribution limits than employer-
sponsored plans,52 involve even more complex participant decision-making 
                                                                                                                 
50 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., 
2013 RCS FACT SHEET #3, at 5 (2013), available at  http://ebri.org/pdf/surveys/ 
rcs/2013/Final-FS.RCS-13.FS_3.Saving.FINAL.pdf. (reporting that only 72% of 
workers are offered a retirement plan by their employer); See Emp. Benefit 
Research Inst., Pension Plan Participation, FAST FACTS (Emp. Benefit Research 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), March 28, 2013, available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/FF.225.DB-DC.28Mar13.pdf. (finding that in 2011, 3% of private sector 
workers participated in a defined benefit plan, 11% participated in both a defined 
benefit and defined contribution plan, and 31% participated only in a defined 
contribution plan). 
51 See supra Part II.B.2. 
52 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671 (stating that in 2013, 
individuals can contribute $17,500 to an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, but can 
contribute only $5,500 to an IRA). 
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than employer plans,53 and are not designed to counteract cognitive biases 
in retirement savings decisions.54 
 There are many ways to address the perceived shortcomings of our 
current system.  We could reform Social Security so that it provided more 
complete income replacement in retirement.  We could implement a 
government-sponsored, universal pension plan.  We could raise 
contribution limits on IRAs.  The proposal offered in this article is an 
incremental reform that is based on the premise that 401(k) plans, and 
defined contribution retirement plans in general, are here to stay and that a 
wholesale shift away from either defined contribution plans or employer-
provided plans is unlikely to be politically viable.  Instead, the universal 
backstop retirement plan is designed to work within the existing employer-
based system to ensure that all individuals have access to a quality 
retirement plan designed to maximize the likelihood that a participant will 
have adequate income in retirement.  The goal is, as best we can, to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding saving and 
investing and suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 As the ACA will do for health plans, the idea of a backstop 
retirement plan is to have a plan available to all individuals, regardless of 
whether they are employed or have access to other retirement plans through 
an employer.  It is offering a new option, not supplanting the existing 
system.  One significant advantage of this type of reform is that it lets the 
backstop plan compete against employer offerings.  It lets participants 
choose the plan that best meets their needs.  In this way, a backstop 
retirement plan is superior to direct regulation of employer plan offerings.  
Employers remain free to design a plan that best meets the needs of their 
                                                                                                                 
53 The decision-making process to establish and fund an IRA is more 
complicated than participation in a 401(k) plan because there are a greater number 
of options. An IRA can be established with numerous investment firms, in contrast 
to an employer that would offer only a single plan. And once an IRA provider is 
selected, an individual can essentially invest her contributions in any publicly 
traded security – making the investment decision more complex compared with a 
401(k) plan that often offers a limited menu of investment options. 
54 Because IRAs must be initiated and established by an individual, design 
features such as automatic enrollment, automatically increasing contribution rates, 
and default investment options typically cannot be utilized. This could change if 
the law required the establishment of so-called payroll IRAs or automatic IRAs, 
recently proposed by President Obama. See Retirement Security for American 
Families, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ 
Retirement_Savings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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employees, or even forgo a plan, but employees will not bear any ill 
consequences of the employer’s decision.  In fact, the backstop retirement 
plan may incent some employers to improve their plan offerings.  It is 
possible, of course, that employers may drop their retirement plans if a 
backstop retirement plan becomes available.  It is important to note that this 
is not necessarily a bad outcome, if the backstop plan is appropriately 
designed.  Employers dropping retirement plans is only problematic if their 
doing so leaves employees worse off with respect to retirement savings.  
An appropriately designed backstop plan, as discussed in more detail 
below, should prevent such an outcome. 
While in reality designing a backstop plan would be a difficult 
process relying on input from many experts and stakeholders, I offer here 
some initial thoughts on basic approaches to the backstop plan and issues to 
be considered.  Some of the design features mentioned would require 
changes to either federal or state law, an issue I discuss in the next subpart. 
The first issue to tackle would be designing the plan to encourage 
participation.  The evidence seems clear that automatic participation, with 
the ability to opt-out, would be preferable to requiring affirmative action to 
begin saving.55 But given that this is a backstop plan, and not merely the 
plan of a single employer, implementing automatic enrollment is 
complicated.  We have three potential categories of participants: employees 
who have access to an employer-sponsored plan, employees without an 
employer plan, and self-employed individuals.  It would be easiest to 
implement automatic enrollment for employed individuals without access 
to an employer plan.  Those individuals could simply be defaulted into the 
backstop plan through required payroll deduction.  For those employees 
who are offered an employer plan, the question becomes which plan they 
should be automatically enrolled in – the backstop plan or the employer 
plan?  The best approach for an employee would depend on how the 
employer plan compares to the backstop plan, so that is of little help in 
determining the default.  One simple solution would be to default the 
employee into the backstop plan only if the employer plan does not provide 
for automatic enrollment.  For self-employed individuals, automatic 
                                                                                                                 
55 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 
S164, S169 (2004); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for 
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167–95 (Jeffrey Brown et al. 
eds., 2009). 
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enrollment is impossible to implement because payroll deduction is not 
practical.  But there are other methods to encourage participation.  Self-
employed individuals could face a small fee for failing to participate in the 
plan (or an equivalent retirement savings vehicle), or they could be 
required to state when filing their federal tax return whether they wish to 
participate in the plan, and be given the ability to direct any tax refund to 
the backstop plan.  These are not ideal, of course, but illustrations of how 
participation can be encouraged without the ease of payroll deduction. 
After tackling the issue of getting individuals into the backstop 
plan, the next design issue is contributions, both participant and employer.  
Ideally, the default contribution level for participants would be a 
percentage of wages which, if contributed over an average working life, 
and taking into account an appropriate investment return assumption, 
would result in a level of income replacement at retirement that would be 
sufficient to provide seventy to eighty percent of pre-retirement income for 
the average life expectancy.56 Obviously, such a contribution level would 
not be ideal for everyone, and in fact may be so large as to result in 
participants either dropping out of the plan entirely or lowering their 
contribution rate.57 Further study would be necessary to select a 
contribution rate that would maximize plan participation and contribution 
rates.  One possibility would be to adjust the contribution rate based on a 
                                                                                                                 
56 Financial planners often suggest that, for most individuals, retirement 
savings should aim to replace 70% to 80% of pre-retirement income, although this 
is at best a rough guide. See, e.g., Jason Jenkins, The New Rule of Thumb for 
Retirement Savings, INVESTMENT U (2012), available at http://www.investmentu. 
com/2012/October/new-rule-of-thumb-for-retirement-savings.html. For a more 
sophisticated analysis of retirement savings needs, see Jonathan Skinner, Are You 
Sure You’re Saving Enough for Retirement? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12981, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 
12981.pdf?new_window=1. 
57 See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 55, at S169–72 (citing behavioral 
analysis which indicates that many individuals who perceive themselves as unable 
to meet current expenditures will not be interested in increasing their participation 
in savings plans if a rate above their perceived ability to save is suggested); See 
Beshears et al., supra note 55, at 171 (noting that employers often set automatic 
enrollment contribution levels low due to the commonly held belief that high 
contribution levels will encourage employees to opt out). 
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participant’s income.58 Another well-tested plan design would be to start 
participants at a low initial contribution rate, and increase that contribution 
rate automatically at specified intervals to gradually bring a participant to 
an adequate savings level.59 
It is important that employers be able to contribute to an 
employee’s account in the backstop plan.  It is easy to imagine that many 
employers would, if a backstop retirement plan were in place, no longer 
sponsor their own 401(k) plan.  But without the ability of employers to 
contribute directly to their employees’ retirement, an important source of 
savings would be lost.  Therefore, making it easy (and tax advantaged) for 
an employer to contribute to an employee’s retirement savings, whether 
through an employer-sponsored plan or the backstop plan, would be an 
important design feature. 
Assuming that participation is encouraged at an adequate savings 
rate, the next design issue, and potentially the most difficult one, is to 
determine both the default and alternative investment options.  The ideal 
default investment is likely a passive fund that offers the appropriate mix of 
risk and return characteristics appropriate for the individual’s savings 
horizon.60 Target date funds, which are designed to automatically shift the 
fund’s asset allocation as the target retirement date nears, are attractive 
because they are designed around the participant’s investment time 
horizon, and they offer one-stop shopping.61 Theoretically, a participant 
could put all of their savings in a single target date fund.  These funds are 
not without risks,62 but they may provide a better default option than others 
readily available.63 
                                                                                                                 
58 Varying contribution rates by income level may be more palatable to low-
income individuals, and could also be designed to reflect the fact that social 
security replaces a larger percentage of income for low-income individuals. 
59 A plan design with automatically increasing contribution rates was 
pioneered by economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. See Thaler & 
Benartzi, supra note 55. 
60 See Kwak, supra note 36. 
61 Julie R. Agnew et al., What People Know About Target-Date Funds: Survey 
and Focus Group Evidence 4 (Fin. Sec. Project at B.C., Working Paper 2011-2), 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/FSP-WP-2011-2.pdf. 
62 See Zvi Bodie et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The Designed-in Risks of Target-
Date Glide Paths, J. FIN. PLAN. (March 15, 2010), available at http://www.fpanet 
.org/journal/CurrentIssue/TableofContents/UnsafeatAnySpeed/. 
63 Zvi Bodie et al., Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans, 1 
ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 249, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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 An important issue worth considering is whether the backstop plan 
should not have participant-directed investment, but should instead operate 
as a cash balance plan, where participants are guaranteed a rate of return on 
their contributions.64 If a cash balance approach is taken, participants would 
not face significant investment risk, a distinct advantage over current 
401(k) plans.65 The price, of course, is that such plans typically have 
conservative rates of return, which may be insufficient to provide adequate 
retirement income given reasonable contribution rates.66 Another option 
would be to default participants into the cash balance plan and allow 
individuals to opt out of the cash balance plan and into a participant-
directed 401(k) plan if desired.  Doing so would allow more sophisticated 
investors to seek higher rates of return than the cash balance plan offers, 
while still offering unsophisticated or risk-adverse investors a guaranteed 
rate of return.   
 Another approach to participant investments would be to invest 
contributions in deferred life annuities, similar to a recent proposal by 
Senator Hatch for public pension plans.67 Investing contributions in 
annuities would both protect employees against investment risk and 
provide them with a guaranteed income stream at retirement.  However, 
like the cash balance option described above, such a structure would not 
necessarily guarantee that the amount of the income stream would be 
adequate. 
                                                                                                                 
abstract_id=1396835. For an interesting example of an investment option that 
utilizes both target date funds and annuities that provide a guaranteed level of 
lifetime income, see Tara Seigel Bernard, A 401(k) That Promises Never to Run 
Dry: [Your Money], N.Y. TIMES Nov. 14, 2012, at F.4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/14/your-money/a-401-k-that-promises-income-
for-life.html?r=0. 
64 Kevin E. Cahill & Mauricio Soto, How Do Cash Balance Plans Affect the 
Pension Landscape?, AN ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. For Ret. Research. Bos. Coll., 
Boston, MA), Dec. 2003, at 1, 1. 
65 See id. at 3; Richard W. Johnson & Cori E. Uccello, Cash Balance Plans: 
What Do They Mean For Retirement Security?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 315, 316–18 
(2004). 
66 See Cahill & Soto, supra note 64 at 3 (noting that cash balance plans on 
average offer a 5.6% rate of return, compared to a market-average rate of return of 
7.6%). 
67 See The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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 The final major design decision concerns plan distributions, both 
before and during retirement.  Allowing easy access to retirement savings 
prior to retirement may significantly endanger retirement security.68 
However, individuals may be more likely to participate in the first place if 
they know that they can access their savings in the event of a financial 
hardship.69  To balance these competing concerns, the plan could offer pre-
retirement distributions only for specific financial hardships,70 instead of 
offering relatively unrestricted pre-retirement access as many employer 
401(k) plans do currently.71 Consideration should be given to whether pre-
retirement access should only be the form of plan loans,72 or whether an 
outright distribution will be permitted, and in what circumstances. 
 The other major design decision with respect to distributions will 
be the form of retirement distributions.  Most participants in 401(k) plans 
receive lump sum distributions.73 However, what most individuals require 
                                                                                                                 
68 See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, 401(k) Plans Are Still Coming Up 
Short, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. C., Boston, MA), Mar. 2006, at 
1, 5, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2006/03/ib_43.pdf. 
69 The evidence regarding whether or to what extent access to funds pre-
retirement increases participation are mixed. Compare Alicia H. Munnell et al., 
What Determines 401(k) Participation and Contributions? 16 (Ctr. for Ret. 
Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-12, 2000), available at http:// 
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2000/12/wp_2000-12.pdf (“the ability to borrow 
increases the contribution rate by about 1 percentage point”), with U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE 
PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME 5 (1997), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98005.pdf (“[p]articipation rates 
in plans with loan provisions are about 6 percentage points higher than plans with 
no loan provisions”). 
70 The IRS publishes a list of “safe harbor” reasons for hardship distributions, 
which could be used in the loan context as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-
1(d)(3)(iii) (2011). 
71 PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AM., PLAN LOAN RESTRICTION STUDY 
(1999), available at http://www.psca.org/RESEARCHDATA/PlanLoanRestriction 
Study/tabid/176/Default.aspx (reporting that 82% of plans did not place restrictions 
on the purposes for which a plan loan would be granted). 
72 Loans have the advantage of allowing the participant to return the retirement 
savings to the plan with interest, but loan repayment may not be possible in some 
financial circumstances. 
73 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 
2749, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT PLAN 
PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 125 (2010), 
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in retirement is lifetime income.74 For this reason, having a life annuity as 
the default form of retirement distribution likely makes the most sense, 
with notice and consent required for other forms of distributions such as 
lump sum or installments.75 
 
1.  A Federal Backstop? 
 
 With the design basics in place, the next issue to consider is 
whether a backstop plan is best offered at the federal or state level.  A 
backstop retirement plan created at the federal level has some advantages 
over state-based plans.  Assuming there is political will to put such a plan 
in place, the federal government could easily pass a law establishing the 
backstop plan that has the basic design features described above.  States, on 
the other hand, would have to work around existing federal law to put such 
a plan in place, as is discussed in more detail below.  A federal plan may 
also make sense given that retirement savings goals and related plan design 
likely do not vary significantly by state, as some other types of programs 
might, and there are also likely to be economies of scale associated with a 
single backstop plan, versus fifty individual plans. 
 The biggest impediment to establishing a federal backstop plan, in 
addition to political will, is the cost.  Assuming that the backstop plan 
would involve extending the tax benefits of employer-sponsored plans to 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2009/ebbl0045.pdf 
(finding that 90% of plan participants had a lump sum distribution option, while 
27% were offered installments and 15% were offered an annuity); VANGUARD, 
DISTRIBUTION DECISIONS AMONG RETIREMENT-AGE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLAN PARTICIPANTS 6 (2010), available at https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/ 
pdf/CRRDDP.pdf (finding that only 2% of retirement-aged participants elected 
installments, whereas 47% took a lump sum distribution and the remainder left 
their account in the plan). 
74 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k) 
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
277, 285–86 (2010) (explaining the process of managing retirement wealth to 
produce an income stream in retirement). 
75 While legislative action to require annuities does not seem imminent, the 
Department of Labor has recently proposed regulations that would require defined 
contribution plans to provide on participant’s benefit statements an estimated 
lifetime income stream based on current retirement savings. Pension Benefit 
Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26727, 26737–38 (proposed May 8, 2013) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520). 
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the backstop plan, the cost of an already expensive tax expenditure would 
increase.76 Given our current fiscal realities, it may be difficult to persuade 
Congress to spend money now in order to save money on supporting 
retirees in the future. 
 One potentially revenue-neutral way to expand tax benefits to the 
backstop plan would be to lower the current 401(k) deferral limits.  In other 
words, to shift some of the current tax benefits available exclusively to 
employer-provided plans to a wider population.  While there are sound 
equity-based arguments for lowering the tax benefit but extending it to a 
wider population, objections might be raised that doing so would have the 
perverse effect of lowering existing rates of retirement savings by those in 
employer plans.  Further study would be necessary to better understand the 
effects of shifting the tax benefit.  The maximum salary deferral in 2014 is 
$17,500, but historical data shows that few participants contribute the 
maximum amount.77 Not surprisingly, the number of participants 
contributing the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan is closely correlated to 
income level.78  While twenty-eight percent of those earning $100,000 or 
more contribute the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan, only one percent of 
those earning between $40,000 and $60,000 do so.79 On average, 
participants contribute between 7.5 and 8% of their income.80 These data 
suggest that the maximum pre-tax deferral to 401(k) plans could be 
lowered without adversely affecting the majority of participants, and the 
minority that would be affected would be relatively high-income 
                                                                                                                 
76 The tax expenditure for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans is 
estimated to be $57 billion in 2013. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 39 
(Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start 
down&id=4503. 
77 See Munnell, supra note 32, at 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See Craig Copeland, 401(k)-Type Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs), EBRI NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2007, 
at 1, 6, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_Notes_10a-2007.pdf (reporting 
average deferral rate of 7.5%); Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to Record 
High at End of 2012, FIDELITY.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.fidelity.com/ 
inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-finds-record-high-average-401k-
balance (reporting 8% average annual deferral rate among Fidelity 401(k) plan 
participants). 
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participants (who are likely to save for retirement even in the absence of a 
tax benefit).81 
 Another way to address the tax issue would be to structure the plan 
as an after-tax plan.  One way to do so, which would require no change to 
tax laws, would be to have contributions to the plan be made on an after-tax 
basis and have participants subject to capital gains taxation when gains or 
losses are realized.82 Another option would be for Congress to make the 
plan operate like a Roth IRA, where contributions are after-tax, but 
distributions are tax-free.83 
 
2. A State Backstop? 
 
  Theoretically, states could take legislative action to do much the 
same thing as the federal solutions described above.  States could create 
their own state-based retirement plan available to all workers, designed to 
produce adequate income replacement for the average worker.  But 
implementing a state-based solution is difficult because of current federal 
limitations.  First, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), preempts any state law that “relates to” an employee benefit 
plan.84 Without getting into the complex details of ERISA preemption, 
suffice it to say that a state law that required employer participation in a 
retirement plan or significantly penalized an employer for failing to 
participate in a retirement plan would be preempted by ERISA.85 As a 
                                                                                                                 
81 See generally Eric M. Engen et al., The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives 
on Saving, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1996) (examining whether and to what extent 
tax incentives increase the level of retirement savings). 
82 Depending on the investment strategy pursued, conventional savings 
accounts without tax deferral can be just as tax efficient as tax-favored accounts 
that tax gains at ordinary rather than capital gains rates. See generally, John B. 
Shoven & Clemens Sialm, Asset Location in Tax-Deferred and Conventional 
Savings Accounts, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 23 (2003) (describing how locating assets 
optimally can significantly improve the risk-adjusted performance of retirement 
saving). 
83 For an overview of the relative tax advantages of Roth IRAs, see Leonard E. 
Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between Front-
Loaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2001). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
85 For a more detailed overview of ERISA preemption in this context, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky. California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice 
Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547 (2014). 
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result, states would be unable to require employer contributions to a state 
retirement plan, although they should be able to require employers to 
facilitate payroll deduction contributions to a state retirement plan. 
  In addition, the federal tax code currently grants tax benefits for 
retirement savings in limited circumstances – either when an employer plan 
is utilized, or when a qualified individual retirement account is used.  As a 
result, if a state were to adopt a state-based retirement plan, it may not be 
able to take advantage of federal income tax preferences.  A state backstop 
retirement plan would not be an employer-provided plan, and therefore 
would be ineligible for existing federal tax benefits for employer plans.  
And while the state plan might be able to qualify as an IRA, structuring the 
plan in such a way would likely prohibit the use of a cash balance design,86 
and would only provide the lower tax benefits available to IRA holders.87 
  Still, there is some reason to believe that this is an area where 
states may be more interested and nimble than the federal government.  
Indeed, California has passed a law requiring employers to either sponsor a 
retirement plan or participate in a state-based retirement plan.88 That law, 
however, is effectively on hold until the state can get favorable ruling from 
the federal government on the tax and ERISA issues noted briefly above 
and described in more detail in Professor Zelinsky’s article in this issue.89 
 States could, of course, design a plan that avoids ERISA 
preemption and does not depend on federal tax benefits for its success.  As 
mentioned in the previous section regarding a federal backstop plan, a state 
plan could allow individuals to invest on a post-tax basis, with any gains 
then being taxed at capital gains rates when realized.  Alternatively, the 
state could offer state-tax benefits to attempt to offset, at least in part, the 
absent federal tax benefits.  For example, a state could exempt from its 
income tax retirement savings contributions regardless of whether such 
contributions were made to an employer-based or state-based plan.90  While 
this would help improve the tax advantage of the state plan, it would not 
                                                                                                                 
86 See id. 
87 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671. 
88 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20139 (2013). 
89 See generally Zelinsky, supra note 85. 
90 While states often adhere to the federal definition of income for tax 
purposes, they are of course free to define income for state income tax purposes in 
any manner they see fit.  For an in-depth discussion of federal-state tax conformity, 
see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity to the Federal Tax Base, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013). 
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put participants in the same tax position they would be in if they 
participated in an employer plan.  A state could, however, offer a state 
matching contribution equal to the estimated value of the federal income 
tax benefit if the contribution had been made to an employer-plan.  Doing 
so could put the individual in the same position as she would have been in 
if federal income tax law treated employer and individual retirement 
savings equally, but it would obviously do so at a cost to state 
governments.  If a state were to expend money on a retirement plan through 
the use of state tax benefits it would likely want to address how to treat 
participants in the state plan who move to a different state either before or 
during retirement.  One possibility would be to have a claw back provision 
that would require repayment of the tax benefit upon losing state residency. 
On the whole, while states may be good laboratories for experiments in this 
area, existing federal law may make it difficult for states to meaningfully 
pursue retirement savings improvements. 
 
 3.  Which Plan Provider? 
 
 Regardless of whether the backstop retirement plan was established 
at the federal or state level, thought would need to be given to which entity 
would most appropriately administer the plan and any investment options.  
One approach would be to designate either a governmental agency or an 
independent agency to administer the plan.  For example, the California 
law establishing a state retirement plan for all workers allows the state to 
designate CALPERS (the California Public Employee Retirement System) 
as the plan administrator.91  Another approach would be to take a free 
market approach, and allow any licensed investment firm to offer a 
retirement plan structured around legal design and investment 
requirements. Providers could also be made subject to basic fiduciary 
duties with respect to participants’ accounts.  While this option involves 
less direct government action than the first proposal, it would also be in 
many ways harder to implement, and may cost participants more if fees are 
not very closely regulated.  If there were numerous providers for these 
plans, it would be difficult to auto-enroll participants, unless some entity 
wanted to take responsibility of assigning individuals to certain providers.  
In addition, it would complicate payroll deduction significantly, given that 
employers would be responsible for transferring contributions to many 
different providers instead of a single entity. 
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B.   CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ALLOW STATE INNOVATION 
 
 There may not be political will at the federal level to implement a 
backstop retirement plan, and states may be hampered in their reform 
efforts by existing federal laws that constrain their options.  One available 
compromise would be for Congress to amend ERISA to allow state 
governments to require automatic enrollment in state retirement plans and 
allow employer contributions to such plans without triggering ERISA 
preemption. Doing so would significantly broaden states’ reform options.  
If this reform is perused, careful thought should be given to whether 
ERISA should apply to such state plans and, if so, whether any of its 
requirements should be modified.92 
 In addition to addressing the ERISA barriers to state action, 
Congress could also amend the tax code to provide tax benefits for state-
based plans that are equivalent to those afforded to private-employer plans.  
There would again be the issue of increased cost, but perhaps Congress 
would be willing to do so in order to see the results of state-based 
retirement plan experiments. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The system of retirement savings on which many Americans 
currently rely does not generate sufficient capital for most individuals to 
adequately replace their income in retirement.  While a widespread shift to 
401(k) plans has likely contributed to this outcome, this article has 
suggested that it is not 401(k) plans per se that are to blame, but rather a 
bad combination of flawed individual decision-making and poor employer 
plan design. The federal government could take a lesson from the ACA and 
create a universally available retirement plan designed to reflect the many 
lessons learned from behavioral economics about encouraging retirement 
savings.  If it is unwilling to do so, it could at the very least make it 
possible for states to meaningfully experiment with universal retirement 
savings options. 
 
                                                                                                                 
92 Historically there has been little political interest in subjecting state 
retirement plans to ERISA regulation.  See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, 
Federal Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption 
Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 291, 297 (2013). 
